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Abstract 
 
In University of California v. Eli Lilly, decided by the Federal Circuit in 1997, the court 
established for the first time a new form of patent law’s written description requirement, 
apparently targeted specifically at biotechnology.  To this day, the conventional wisdom 
is that the so-called Lilly written description requirement (“LWD”) exists as a 
biotechnology-specific “super-enablement” requirement, substantially more stringent 
than the enablement requirement (the conventional standard for patentability), and 
standing as an impediment to effective patent protection for biotechnology inventions.  
My objective in writing this article was to test this conventional wisdom, by conducting a 
comprehensive search for all LWD decisions of the federal courts and the U.S. Patent 
Office’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”), and collecting and 
individually analyzing each case.  The analysis focuses on the extent to which LWD is 
actually functioning as a biotechnology-specific super-enablement requirement.  For 
many, the results of this study will likely come as a surprise, because the empirical 
evidence demonstrates that the impact of LWD in the courts and BPAI has been 
minimal—for the most part, LWD does not function as a super-enablement requirement 
but merely as a redundant surrogate for the enablement requirement.  The article 
ultimately concludes that LWD’s main impact has been one of doctrinal confusion, rather 
than imposing any substantial barrier to the patenting of biotechnology inventions, and 
recommends that the courts effectively discard LWD as redundant and unnecessary. It 
suggests alternative approaches for addressing the valid policy concerns that implicitly 
drove the original Lilly decision. 
2IS LILLY WRITTEN DESCRIPTION A PAPER TIGER?: A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT 
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“They are paper tigers, weak and indecisive” (Frederick Forsyth).1
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3I.  INTRODUCTION 
The patent law’s written description requirement has traditionally functioned as a 
doctrine for policing against the late claiming of new matter, i.e., to prevent patent 
applicants from “adding new inventions to an older disclosure.”2 However, in the 1997 
decision of Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly3 the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit embarked upon a new course, holding that the written description 
requirement is also a general disclosure requirement, applicable to originally filed claims 
and functioning in a manner more analogous to the enablement requirement than 
traditional written description.4 Lilly has been perceived by many as transforming written 
description into a “super-enablement” requirement specifically targeting biotechnology 
and substantially restricting the patentability of biotechnology-related inventions.5 In 
particular, the decision seems to require an explicit disclosure of chemical structure to 
support a patent claim reciting a biomolecule,6 such as the DNA sequences at issue in 
Lilly, with the effect of dramatically limiting the scope of available patent protection for 
this critically important technology.  Lilly engendered a strong backlash on the part of the 
biotechnology community, legal scholars and members of the judiciary, many of whom 
argued vehemently that the Lilly written description doctrine (“LWD”) would prevent 
 
2 Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle, 375 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, R., dissenting from 
denial of rehearing en banc). 
3 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
4 See, e.g., Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 834-35 (1999) ("Thus in [ Lilly the Federal Circuit] broke new ground by 
applying the written description requirement not only to later-filed claims but also to claims filed in the 
original patent”) requirement."  See infra Part  III. 
5 See infra Part III. 
6 Although the term biomolecule can be used in a broader sense, in this article the term is limited to 
polynucleotides (e.g., DNA, RNA, nucleic acids) and polypeptides (e.g., proteins and peptides). 
4biotechnology inventors from achieving adequate patent protection for their inventions, 
to the substantial detriment of the industry and society as a whole.7
In this article, I rigorously address the following question: in the nine years since 
Lilly was decided, what has been the actual impact of LWD in the courts and the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (the “PTO”)?  To that end, I have conducted a 
comprehensive search for all publicly accessible decisions of the federal courts and the 
PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences (“BPAI”) that decide an issue of LWD.  
Each decision is individually reviewed and analyzed, with an eye toward discerning the 
extent to which the dire predictions concerning LWD have come to pass.  The results to 
be gleaned from this exercise might come as a surprise to many, for they reveal that for 
the most part LWD has had a relatively minor impact in the courts and BPAI. 
In Part II of this paper, I begin by reviewing the traditional written description and 
enablement requirements, with some emphasis on the application of the enablement 
requirement to biotechnology and chemical inventions.  Part III discusses Lilly, the 
genesis of LWD, and the Federal Circuit’s subsequent retreat from a strict application of 
LWD in Enzo Biochem v. Gen-Probe (Enzo II).  The results of my summary of LWD in 
the courts and BPAI are presented in Part IV, and in Part V I conclude with some general 
observations and commentary. 
II.  THE TRADITIONAL WRITTEN DESCRIPTION AND ENABLEMENT REQUIREMENTS 
Section 112 of the patent statute requires that a patent specification “contain a 
written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using 
it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art … 
 
7 See infra Part III. 
5to make and use the same.”8 This clause is the statutory basis for two discreet 
patentability requirements, the enablement and written description requirements.9
Prior to Lilly, the enablement and written description requirements were generally 
understood to serve distinct and essentially non-overlapping purposes, and the criteria for 
compliance with each were likewise distinct.  The written description requirement 
functioned as a tool for policing against attempts by patent applicants to alter their patent 
claims during the course of patent prosecution10 to encompass “new matter” not 
adequately described in the originally filed patent application.11 As summarized in a 
recent Federal Circuit decision, the “function of the [written] description requirement is 
to ensure that the inventor had possession, as of the filing date of the application relied 
on, of the specific subject matter later claimed by him."12 
Because the written description requirement traditionally functioned solely as a 
tool for policing priority and to prevent patent applicants from claiming “new matter,” it 
was considered inapplicable to originally filed patent claims.  An original patent claim is 
part of the patent specification, and since a claim inherently describes the subject matter 
it encompasses it must satisfy the written description requirement, or at least that was the 
consensus opinion prior to Lilly.13 
8 35 USC § 112, ¶ 1 (2004). 
9 In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d  990 (C.C.P.A. 1967) has been identified as the earliest decision wherein the 
written description requirement was clearly identified as a requirement of patentability distinct from 
enablement.  Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
10 Patent prosecution is the “process of applying for a patent through the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
and negotiating with the patent officer”. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY [?] (8th ed. 2004). 
11 See, e.g., 3-7 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.04 (2006). (providing a comprehensive 
explanation of the written description requirement). 
12 Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed Cir. 2003) (citing In re Wertheim, 
541 F.2d 257, 262 (C.C.P.A.  1976)). 
13 See, e.g., Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1308 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, R., 
dissenting) (citing previous decisions of the C.C.P.A. ). 
6The enablement requirement, on the other hand, applies to both original and 
amended claims, and essentially requires the patent specification to enable a person 
having ordinary skill in the art, often referred to as the “PHOSITA,” to practice the 
invention without engaging in “undue experimentation.”14 The Federal Circuit has 
established a number of criteria, commonly referred to as the “Wands factors,” to be 
considered by the court and PTO in assessing a patent specification for compliance with 
the enablement requirement.15 
The enablement requirement is also used to police claim breadth, limiting 
inventors to a scope of claim coverage commensurate with the scope of the actual 
inventive disclosure in the patent specification.  An inventor is permitted to claim her 
invention in broad terms that encompass various embodiments not specifically described, 
or even enabled by the disclosure in the patent specification.16 However, there is a limit 
on overly expansive claim coverage, and that limit has traditionally been determined by 
application of the enablement requirement.  Under conventional enablement 
jurisprudence, the scope of a patent claim must bear some “reasonable correlation” with 
the scope of disclosure in the patent specification.17 
One of the earliest decisions where the “reasonable correlation” test was applied 
to what might be characterized as a biotechnology invention was In re Fisher.18 The 
invention was an improved process for purifying adrenocorticotrophic hormones 
 
14 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736-737 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
15 Id. at 737. 
16 See, e.g., Infigen, Inc. v. Advanced Cell Technology, Inc., 65 F.Supp.2d 967, 975 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (“It 
is black letter law that claims are not limited to the embodiment described in the patent specifications. 
Moreover, a patent claim may encompass uses not anticipated by the inventor and therefore not described 
in the patent.”) (citations omitted). 
17 In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839 (C.C.P.A.  1970). 
18 427 F.2d 833 (C.C.P.A.  1970). 
7(ACTH), naturally-occurring protein hormone useful in the treatment of arthritis.  Fisher 
asserted that the prior art had failed to produce an ACTH preparation having an activity 
of 1 International Units per milligram (IU/mg), but that his improved process had allowed 
him to produce ACTH preparations having activities of between 1.11 and 2.30 IU/mg.19 
This increase in activity translated into improved purity and potency, which enhanced 
therapeutic efficacy, clearly a breakthrough deserving of some patent protection.  
However, Fisher sought to patent all ACTH preparations having an activity greater than 1 
IU/mg, including preparations far exceeding the 2.30 IU/mg he had actually enabled.  
Clearly the scope of the patent claim extended well beyond the inventor’s actual 
achievement; the question for the court was did the claim’s scope exceed a “reasonable 
correlation” with the scope of disclosure? 
The court began by affirming the bedrock principle that an inventor is allowed a 
scope of patent coverage that will “dominate the future patentable inventions of others 
where those inventions were based in some way on his teachings,” including 
improvements not specifically described and that would not be obvious based on the 
teachings of the disclosure.20 However, the court held that by failing to include an upper 
activity limit on the claim, the scope of asserted patent coverage crossed the line between 
a permitted “domination” of subsequent improvements and inventions, and into the 
forbidden realm exceeding a “reasonable correlation to the scope of enablement provided 
by the specification to persons of ordinary skill in the art.”21 
19 Id. at 834.  The International Unit (IU) is a measure of potency, which is related to the efficacy of the 
purification process. 
20 Id. at 839. 
21 Id. 
8In Fisher, the court articulated four basic tenets regarding the relationship 
between claim scope and enablement that are still the standard today: (1) claim scope can 
substantially exceed the scope of disclosure to encompass patentably distinct variants and 
improvements;22 (2) claim scope cannot, however, be expanded so far as to exceed a 
“reasonable correlation” with the scope of disclosure;23 (3) the permitted scope of 
coverage is related to the predictability of the area of technology at issue;24 and (4) 
biotechnology and chemical inventions are generally less predictable than mechanical 
and electrical inventions, and hence generally less likely to be eligible for expansive 
scope of coverage.25 
Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. (Amgen Inc. v. HMR) provides an 
example of the Federal Circuit upholding the validity of broad biotechnology claims 
encompassing variants not specifically described or “enabled” by the patent 
specification.26 Based on the disclosure of methods for expressing recombinant EPO27 in 
two mammalian cell lines (COS-1 and CHO), Amgen obtained patent claims covering (i) 
all pharmaceutical compositions comprising a therapeutically effective amount of human 
EPO purified from mammalian cell culture; (ii) the production of any EPO that is either 
non-naturally occurring or not isolated from human urine; and (iii) all vertebrate cells that 
can be propagated in vitro, comprise “non-human DNA sequences that control 
 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id.  However, in In re Cook, the court indicated that the distinction is more properly ''denominated a 
dichotomy between predictable and unpredictable factors in any art rather than between 'mechanical cases' 
and 'chemical cases.’” In re Cook , 439 F.2d 730, 734 (C.C.P.A.  1971). 
26 314 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2003).   
27 EPO is short for erythropoietin, a hormone that stimulates the production and release of red blood cells in 
response to low oxygen levels. Id. at 1319, 1321. 
9transcription” and produce a recited amount of EPO.28 The Federal Circuit found the 
claims to encompass and be infringed by production methods and recombinant human 
cells that were not described or contemplated in the patent specification.29 Moreover, the 
infringing cells and processes could not have been made at the time Amgen’s patents 
were filed, because the necessary technology was not developed until years later.30 
Nevertheless, the court upheld the validity of the claims, skirting the “reasonable 
correlation” test and holding that “the law makes clear that the specification need teach 
only one mode of making and using a claimed composition.”31 The problem with the 
courts analysis, as noted by a dissent to the decision,32 is that the specification did not 
teach any mode of creating certain embodiments falling with within the scope of the 
claims, such as the recombinant human cells and EPO produced by HMR.33 
On the other hand, courts have on numerous occasions invoked the “reasonable 
correlation” test to invalidate broad biotechnology and chemical claims.34  For example, 
 
28 Id. at 1322-23. 
29 Id. at 1334 (finding that the patentee could not have described the infringing method because it was not 
developed until ten years after the patent was filed). 
30 This later-developed technology was itself the subject of its own patent protection.  Infra n.103. 
31 Id. at 1335. 
32 Id. at 1359. 
33 Other examples where courts have found broad “dominating” claims extending well beyond the 
disclosure of the patent specification to nevertheless comply with the enablement requirement include In re 
Hogan 559 F.2d 595 (C.C.P.A.  1977) (disclosure of method of producing crystalline polymer of 
polypropylene was sufficient to enable a claim encompassing amorphous polymer of polypropylene, even 
though amorphous polymer was not enabled); and Hormone Research Foundation Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 
904 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (disclosure of a method for producing human growth hormone can provide 
sufficient enabling disclosure to support a claim encompassing purer and more potent forms of the hormone 
that could not be produced using the teaching of the disclosure). 
34 See, e.g., In re Vaeck, 947 F.2d 488 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (claims directed to chimeric genes comprising a 
Cyanobacterium promoter region operatively linked to a gene encoding a bacillus insecticidal protein were 
not enabled by patent specification that describes provides working examples for only a single species of 
Cyanobacterium and only mentions 9 out of the roughly 150 different known genera of Cyanobacterium); 
In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (claims directed generically to methods of producing vaccines 
against avian RNA viruses not enabled by a general description of the process and one working example 
describing the production of a vaccine effective against a single strain of avian RNA virus); In re Goodman 
11 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (claims covering expression of mammalian peptides in any plant cell 
(monocot or dicot) not enabled because at the time the patent application was filed the technology was not 
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in In re Wright35 an attempt was made to claim all vaccines against RNA viruses, based 
on the disclosure of a single working example describing the production of a vaccine 
effective against a single strain of avian RNA virus.36 Other examples from the realm of 
biotechnology include In re Goodman,37 where the applicant attempted to claim the 
expression of mammalian peptides in any plant based on success in a dicot, even though 
monocots were not enabled,38 and Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 39 where the 
applicant essentially attempted to claim the use of antisense technology40 in any cell type 
based on a disclosure limited to E. coli, a single species of bacteria. 
Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co, Ltd. is a striking example of the 
Federal Circuit applying a particularly strict interpretation of the reasonable correlation 
test.41 Amgen’s patent was based on the isolation and structural characterization the 
 
available for inserting genes into the genome of a monocot);  Genentech Inc. v. The Wellcome Foundation 
Ltd., 29 F.3d 1555, 1564-65 n.24 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (in construing claims, court found that applying a broad 
definition of the term “human tissue plasminogen activator'' would render the claims overly broad and 
invalid for failure to comply with the enablement requirement); Enzo Biochem v. Calgene, 188 F.3d 1362 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (claims directed broadly to use of antisense technology in any cell type were not enabled 
by disclosure limited to E. coli, a single species of bacteria); Plant Genetic Systems, N.V. v. DeKalb 
Genetics Corp.315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (claim covering any plant cell (monocot or dicot) having 
defined heterologous DNA sequence inserted into its genome was not enabled because at the time the 
patent application was filed the technology was not available for inserting genes into the genome of a 
monocot); Chiron v. Genentech, 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (disclosure of a mouse antibody capable of 
binding a specific human breast cancer antigen did not enable claim covering chimeric antibody capable of 
binding same antigen). 
35 999 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
36 Note that a number of important human disease are caused by RNA viruses, such as HIV, and thus the 
scope of coverage would encompass potential future innovations of great importance that are not enabled 
by the disclosure.   
37 11 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
38 Flowering plants fall into two classifications: monocots characterized by having only one cotyledon 
(“seed leaf”) produced by the embryo, and the dicot having two cotyledon produced by the embryo.  
University of California Museum of Paleontology Glossary, at 
http://www.ucmp.berkeley.edu/glossary/gloss8/monocotdicot.html. (last visited Sept. 6, 2006). 
39 188 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
40 Antisense technology is the process in which the antisense strand hydrogen bonds with the targeted sense 
strand. When an antisense strand binds to a mRNA sense strand, a cell will recognize the double helix as 
foreign to the cell and proceed to degrade the faulty mRNA molecule, thus preventing the production of the 
undesired protein.  www.bio.davidson.edu/Courses?Molbio/MolStudents/01suschultz/homepage.html, last 
accessed 8/30/06. 
41 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
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human gene encoding erythropoietin (EPO),42 a major accomplishment, because it 
allowed for the large-scale manufacturing of recombinant EPO.43 A patent claim limited 
to the gene encoding naturally-occurring (i.e., native) human EPO might have been easily 
circumvented by a competitor producing a structural variant of EPO retaining the desired 
functional attributes of the native protein, e.g., by a technique such as site-directed 
mutagenesis.44 In an attempt to preclude this sort of trivial design around, Amgen 
obtained a patent claim encompassing any DNA sequence encoding a protein having an 
amino acid sequence “sufficiently duplicative” of erythropoietin (EPO) to retain the 
function of EPO.45 The Federal Circuit invoked the enablement requirement to and the 
“reasonable correlation” test to invalidate the claim as overly broad. 
Amgen v. Chugia was written by Judge Lourie, author of Lilly, and the leading 
advocate for LWD on the Federal Circuit, and clearly foreshadows the focus on chemical 
structure evident in Lilly and other related biotechnology cases.46 In particular, the court 
points to the “manifold possibilities” for changes to the structure of EPO “with attendant 
 
42 In the language of biotechnology, the scientists cloned and sequenced the gene, which allowed for the 
recombinant expression of EPO. 
43 Recombinant EPO, sold under trade names such as EPOGEN by Amgen and others, is used to treat 
anemia, and was one of the first, and still is one of the most successful of all biotechnology products.  
Amgen, Inc. website, http://www.amgen.com/patients/products_epogen.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2006). 
44 Site-directed mutagenesis was well known and specifically described in the Amgen patents, along with a 
description of using the technique to make functionally-equivalent variants of the disclosed EPO.   See, 
e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008.  The vulnerability of narrow biomolecule claims to infringement by trivial 
design around is described in detail in Christopher M. Holman, Protein Similarity Score: A Simplified 
Version of the BLAST Score as a Superior Alternative to Percent Identity for Claiming Genuses of Related 
Protein Sequences, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 55 (2004).  See also Enzo Biochem, 
Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc. 323 F.3d 956, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (expert testified that broad claim scope covering 
an “astronomical” number of mutated variants of a disclosed genetic sequence is necessary to protect 
against copyists who could otherwise make a minor change to the sequence and thereby avoid infringement 
while still exploiting the benefits of the invention). 
45 In particular, any EPO variants sharing native EPO’s biological property of causing an increased 
production of red blood cells, the characteristic that made recombinant EPO an extremely useful drug for 
treating anemia.   
46 See also, Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164 (Fed.Cir.1993) and In re Wallach, 378 F.3d 1330 (CAFC 2004).  
The focus on chemical structure in assessing the patentability of biomolecule is also evident in In re Bell 
and In re Deuel, two other decisions penned by Judge Lourie but in the context of nonobviousness.  In re 
Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed.Cir.1993); In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (1995). 
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uncertainty as to what utility will be possessed by these analogs,” and the failure of 
Amgen to identify “structural requirements for producing compounds with EPO-like 
activity.”47 The court also faults the Amgen for claiming “an astronomical number of 
species” while disclosing how to make and use only a few of them, a concern which 
reappears in Lilly albeit in the context of written description. 
The BPAI has also applied the enablement requirement’s “reasonable correlation” 
test in a similar matter to broad biomolecule claims lacking structure-based limitations.  
For example, in Ex parte Maizel,48 a patent applicant disclosed the amino acid sequence 
of a protein (human B-cell growth factor) and attempted to claim any DNA vector 
encoding that protein or a “biologically functional equivalent thereof.” The Board held 
the claim invalid for lack of enablement, opining that the “problem with the phrase 
‘biologically functional equivalent thereof’ is that it covers any conceivable means, i.e.,
cell or DNA, which achieves the stated biological result while the specification discloses, 
at most, only a specific DNA segment known to the inventor.”49 
Thus, it is clear that prior to Lilly the courts and PTO already had in the 
enablement requirement a fairly robust doctrinal tool for limiting patent claims to a scope 
commensurate with the inventor’s disclosure, and had on occasion applied the 
requirement with some rigor to biotechnology inventions, e.g., Amgen v. Chugai and Ex 
parte Maizel. Professor Janis has noted that the courts have for the most part failed to 
exercise the potential power of the enablement as a tool for limiting claim scope.50 Any 
 
47 927 F.2d at 1214 
48 27 USPQ2d 1662 (BPAI 1992).  See also, Ex parte Ishizaka, 24 USPQ2d 1621 (B.P.A.I. 1992) and 
Fiddes v. Baird, 30 USPQ2d 1481 (B.P.A.I. 1993). 
49 Id. at 1665. 
50 Mark D. Janis, Contending with the "Written Description" Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent 
Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 55, 106-108 (2000). 
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critical assessment of LWD as a “super-enablement” should be undertaken with this in 
mind.   
III. THE GENESIS OF LWD 
A. Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly 
In 1997, Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co. substantially blurred what had 
been a clear delineation between the enablement and written description requirements.51 
The patent at issue arose out of the successful cloning of the rat insulin gene,52 a technical 
tour de force achieved by scientists at the University of California at the dawn of the 
biotechnology era.53 In the patent specification, the inventors provided the chemical 
structure of the rat gene, i.e., the gene’s “sequence,” along with a description of the 
specific methodology used to isolate the gene, and a prophetic description purporting to 
describe how one would go about isolating the gene from other mammals and vertebrates, 
including man.54 UC succeeded in convincing the PTO that this limited disclosure was 
adequate to support a patent claim specifically covering the human insulin gene, and 
other claims generically encompassing all mammalian and all vertebrate insulin genes.  
UC then sued Eli Lilly, alleging that Lilly’s production of recombinant human insulin 
infringed the patent.  However, the district court hearing the case held that the human, 
 
51 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
52 In this context the term “insulin gene” is used as shorthand for what would be more accurately described 
as a cDNA encoding rat proinsulin. 
53 Lilly involved two patents, but the one of interest for our purposes is U.S. Patent No. 4,652,525. 
54 A gene is essentially a chemical compound, a type of DNA molecule, comprising a string of chemical 
building blocks referred to as “bases.”  Likewise, a protein is essentially a string of amino acids, another 
type of chemical building block.  With respect to both DNA and proteins, molecular biologists commonly 
use the term “sequence” to refer both to the molecule itself and to the molecule’s structure.  In attempt to 
minimize confusion, in this article I generally use the word “sequence” to refer to the actual DNA or 
protein molecule, and the word “structure” to refer to the molecules chemical structure. 
14
mammalian and vertebrate claims were invalid for failure to satisfy the written 
description requirement, and on appeal the Federal Circuit affirmed.55 
The biotechnology and patent communities was shocked by Lilly, particularly 
because of the novel manner in which the court applied the written description 
requirement to originally filed claims, and the stringent disclosure requirements the 
decision seemed to impose on biotechnology inventors.  For example, with respect to the 
claim specifically directed to the human insulin gene, the court held that “[a]n adequate 
written description of a DNA ‘requires a precise definition, such as by structure, formula, 
chemical name, or physical properties,’ not a mere wish or plan for obtaining the claimed 
chemical invention.”56 Because the specification did not provide the “relevant structural 
or physical characteristics” of the human gene, i.e., its genetic sequence, it did not 
provide adequate written description, regardless of whether the specification enabled the 
human gene.57 
With respect to the broader claims directed to mammalian and vertebrate insulin 
genes, the court held that a generic description, such as “vertebrate insulin [gene],” was 
insufficient absent some structural description that would allow one to distinguish genetic 
sequences falling within the scope of the claim from other, non-claimed genetic 
sequences.  The court viewed the claimed genus of genetic sequences as being defined 
solely in terms of function, i.e., the ability to encode for insulin, and held that such a 
purely functional description was insufficient with respect to chemical inventions in 
 
55 119 F.3d at 1575. 
56 Id. at 1565 (citing Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d 1164, 1171 (Fed.Cir.1993)). 
57 Neither the Federal Circuit nor the district court decisions even speculate as to whether any of the claims 
at issue were enabled, and the issue was never raised by the parties in their briefs submitted to the Federal 
Circuit. 
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general, and DNA sequences in particular.  The court posited that adequate written 
description to support a claimed genus of genes “may be achieved by means of a 
recitation of a representative number of [genes], defined by nucleotide sequence, falling 
within the scope of the genus or of a recitation of structural features common to the 
members of the genus, which features constitute a substantial portion of the genus.”58 
While providing no guidance with respect to how many representative species might be 
required, nor what if any alternative avenues might exist for supporting a genus claim 
encompassing a family of related genetic sequences, the court held that the single rat 
sequence was insufficient to support a claim reciting all mammalian or all vertebrate 
species. 
In Lilly, the court applies written description in a manner closely analogous to 
enablement, but the standard for compliance appears to be more stringent than the 
enablement requirement.  In particular, while the enablement requirement mandates that 
the specification to teach the PHOSITA to make and use the invention without “undue 
experimentation,” in Lilly the court interprets the written description requirement as 
requiring a “precise definition of a molecule’s physical or structural characteristics.”  At 
least with respect to genetic sequences, the court appears to be requiring a precise, 
nucleotide-by-nucleotide recitation of chemical structure.  And while enablement merely 
requires a “reasonable correlation” between the scope of disclosure and the scope of the 
claims, Lilly seems require some sort of structure-based definition of a claimed genus of 
molecules, achievable by providing a “representative number” of structurally defined 
 
58 Id. 
16
examples, or a recitation of common structural features sufficient to distinguish the 
genus. 
In recognition of the fundamental difference between traditional written 
description and written description as applied by the court in Lilly, subsequent courts and 
commentators have characterized the written description requirement as composed of two 
distinct prongs: (1) the traditional written description requirement that polices priority 
and does not apply to originally filed claims, and (2) the Lilly written description 
requirement (“LWD”).59 
In assessing the impact of LWD, it should be noted that the claims at issue in Lilly 
could have been invalidated under the enablement requirement, without needing to resort 
to written description.  With respect to the to the human insulin gene claim, a reasonable 
court could concluded that the specification did not provide sufficient guidance to enable 
a PHOSITA to successfully isolate the gene without engaging in “undue 
experimentation.”  In this regard, it must be remembered that the patent claimed a priority 
date of 1977, a time when the methodology for cloning genes was just being developed 
and when the process was far from routine or predictable.60 The patent specification 
provides a prophetic example describing a proposed method for cloning the human gene 
(essentially the same method used to clone the rat gene), but this methodology apparently 
did not work for the human gene, because the same inventors reported eventually cloning 
the human gene using a very different methodology.61 In any event, although reasonable 
 
59 See, e.g., Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
60 See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 1989 WL 169006 (D.Mass. 1989), for a description of the 
unpredictability associated with attempting to clone a gene in the early 1980’s several years after UC’s 
filing date. 
61 In U.S. Patent No. 4,431,740, the UC inventors report isolating the human insulin gene by in situ 
hybridization screening.  In U.S. Patent No. 4,652,525, the patent with respect to which written description 
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minds might differ with respect to application of the “undue experimentation” standard to 
the facts of this case, clearly a court seeking to invalidate the claim would have been able 
to reasonably characterize the invention as requiring undue experimentation based on the 
fact that the technology was nascent, and the only methodology described in the 
specification for cloning the human insulin gene was apparently never successfully 
implemented. 
Turning to the claims broadly asserting patent rights in the insulin genes from any 
mammal, or even any vertebrate, an invocation of the “reasonable correlation” should 
have been sufficient to invalidate these claims.  At that early stage in the study of 
molecular biology, when many mammals had not been the subject of any such research, a 
strong case could have been made that it would have required more than an undue 
amount of experimentation to successfully clone the genes from other mammals and 
vertebrates. 
B. The Backlash Against Lilly 
Lilly has proven to be a highly controversial decision.  Many commentators have 
characterized LWD as a “super-enablement requirement” substantially limiting the ability 
of inventors to patent biotechnological inventions, some going so far as to suggest that 
the doctrine actually poses a substantial threat to the vitality of the biotechnology 
industry.  Typical of the tone in the immediate aftermath of Lilly was an article, published 
in 1998, which lambasted Lilly as “an unmitigated disaster that if followed, has the 
 
was at issue, the prophetic example purporting to enable the isolation of the human insulin gene relies on a 
different methodology that does not involve in situ hybridization screening.  In situ hybridization screening 
is not even mentioned in the ‘525 patent. 
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potential for causing untold havoc in the biotechnology field.”62 In the same year, 
another commentator wrote that “[in] Lilly, the Federal Circuit has fashioned a newly 
heightened Written Description standard unique to biotechnological inventions. . . . The 
Lilly decision may profoundly limit the scope of protection available for new gene 
inventions.” 63 This view of Lilly has survived through the years. 64 For example, in 
2002, another commentator wrote that, in Lilly, the “Federal Circuit has effectively 
eliminated patent protection for biotechnology inventions pertaining to proteins.” 65 And 
in 2004, Professor Holbrook stated that “failure to have a full disclosure of examples in 
the biotechnology field may invite a rejection for want of ‘possession’ of the invention, 
and hence lack of a ‘written description.’"66 
Some members of the judiciary have also weighed in with their concerns 
regarding LWD.  For example, Judge Michel of the Federal Circuit has argued that LWD, 
in conjunction with a restrictive interpretation of the doctrine of equivalents, will 
effectively preclude biotechnology inventors from achieving adequate patent protection 
their inventions.67 
62 Harris A. Pitlick, The Mutation of the Description Requirement Gene 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.
SOC'Y 209, 222 (1998). 
63 Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnological 
Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 615 (1998). 
64 In a dissent by Judge Rader in the Federal Circuit’s decision not to rehear Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. 
Searle, he provides an appendix summarizing much of the academic commentary with respect to the Lilly 
Doctrine, including “31 articles criticizing the Eli Lilly doctrine, 7 articles defending the doctrine, and 16 
neutrally commenting on the state of this evolving case law.”373 F.3d at 1309 n.4. 
65 Sheila R. Arriola, Biotechnology Patents after Festo: Rethinking the Heightenedd Enablement and 
Written Description Requirements, 11 FED. CIRCUIT B. J. 919, 951 (2002).  See also, Shradda A. 
Upadhyaya, The Postmodern Written Description Requirement: An Analysis of the Application of the 
Heightened Written Description Requirement to Original Claims, 4 MINN. INTELL. PROP. REV. 65 (2002) 
(Lilly has the potential to “thwart progress of biotechnology”). 
66 Harold C. Wegner, The Disclosure Requirements of the 1952 patent Act: Looking Back and a New 
Statute for the Next Fifty Years, 37 AKRON L. REV. 243, 247 (2004). 
67 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 617 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Michel, P.  
concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part) (“Considering the vast number of specific amino acid sequences that 
an applicant would be forced to disclose and claim in order to secure meaningful protection for his 
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Judge Rader is probably the most outspoken critic of the Lilly doctrine on the 
Federal Circuit.  For example, he wrote in his dissent to the Federal Circuit’s decision not 
to rehear Univ. of Rochester v. Searle en banc:68 
The Eli Lilly doctrine also seems to impose some illogical 
requirements on patent drafters today. Must a software patent disclose 
every potential coding variation that performs a claimed function? Must a 
biotechnological invention list every amino acid variation for a particular 
protein or protein function--a task conceivably as impractical as the 
software disclosure requirement? Must a university or small biotech 
company expend scarce resources to produce every potential nucleotide 
sequence that exhibits their inventive functions? Perhaps more important 
for overall patent policy, must inventors spend their valuable time and 
resources fleshing out all the obvious variants of their last invention 
instead of pursuing their next significant advance in the useful arts? Again 
Eli Lilly and Rochester appear to have given little thought to these 
unintended consequences. 
 
The apprehension surrounding LWD focused primarily on its apparent effect of 
limiting patent protection to DNA and other biomolecules for which the patent applicant 
has disclosed “precisely defined” chemical structures.  For example, Judge Rader 
recently interpreted Lilly as requiring a “nucleotide-by-nucleotide recitation of the 
structure of a biotechnological invention.”69 This view that LWD requires a precise 
structural definition engendered much of the outcry against Lilly.70 
invention, I feel the majority's rule puts an impossible burden on both the applicant and the PTO.”), vacated 
535 U.S. 722. 
68 373 F.3d at 1313-1314. 
69 375 F.3d at 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
70 See, e,g., Elliot Marshall, Court Takes a Narrow View of UC’s Claim, 277 SCIENCE 1029 (1997) 
(predicting that Lilly will have a broad impact on biotechnology by “compelling gene hunters to spell out 
the exact sequence of the DNA they hope to claim, rather than just the function of the genes”); Margaret J. 
Sampson, The Evolution of the Enablement and Written Description Requirements under 35 USC 112 in 
the Area of Biotechnology, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1233, 1273 (2000) (concluding that Lilly requires the 
disclosure of exact nucleotide sequences for genetic material, which she says is a good thing (putting her in 
the minority of commentators)); David Kelly , The Federal Circuit Transforms the Written Description 
Requirement into a Biotech-Specific Hurdle to Obtaining Patent Protection for Biotechnology Patents, 13 
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 249, 270 (2002) (concluding that Lilly imposes a unique biotech-specific written 
description standard to limit DNA claims to specific sequence disclosed); Mueller, supra note 63 at 631 
(concluding that Lilly announced a “precise definition” test for the written description of DNA inventions); 
Mark A. Lemley & Dan L. Burk, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L.R. 1575, 1678-1679 (2003) 
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LWD has also been viewed as profoundly limiting the scope of patent protection 
available for biotechnological inventions, leaving inventors with very narrow claims, 
easily designed around by slight modification to a disclosed structure.71 For example, 
Lemley and Burk recently wrote that in biotechnology LWD “has been applied as a sort 
of "super-enablement" requirement, forcing biotech patentees to list particular gene 
sequences in order to obtain a patent covering those sequences. . . . The Federal Circuit 
has applied the [Lilly] doctrine to biotechnology cases in a way that would be 
inconceivable in other industries, such as software.  The effect is to narrow the scope of 
biotechnology patents – or at least DNA patents – rather dramatically.”72 Commentators 
have posited that LWD, in conjunction with the Federal Circuit’s apparent reluctance to 
find a DNA sequence obvious absent explicit disclosure in the prior art, render it very 
easy to get a patent covering a newly disclosed DNA sequence, but that the protection 
will be very narrow, resulting in numerous extremely narrow DNA patents.73 
To summarize, LWD has been characterized as problematic for the patent system, 
and for biotechnology inventors in particular, owing primarily to the perception that: (1) 
LWD requires an explicit description of chemical structure in order to support a claim to 
a genetic sequence or other biomolecule, e.g., a “nucleotide-by-nucleotide listing”; and 
 
(stating essentially that one can only patent specific sequences that have actually been isolated or 
sequenced); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, 54 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 691, 704 (2004) (“Under the Federal Circuit's precedent, a researcher will be able to claim only 
sequences disclosed under the stringent written description rules--the actual sequence in hand, so to 
speak.”). 
71 Holman, supra  note 44. 
72 Lemley & Burk, supra note 70, at 1652-54.  See also, Mueller, supra note 63 at 649 (“In practical terms, 
Lilly may profoundly limit the scope of protection available for new gene inventions.”); Daniel P. 
Chisholm, The Effect of the USPTO’s Written Description Guidelines on Gene Patent Applications, 35 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 543  (concluding that narrow patents on genetic inventions, as required by Lilly, could 
provide insufficient incentives and impede genetic research). 
73 Id. at 1594-95.  
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(2) LWD functions as a super-enablement requirement substantially restricting the 
availability of adequate claim scope for biotech inventions. 
C. Enzo I: The Worst Fears Confirmed 
It was not until five years after Lilly that the Federal Circuit decided a case 
involving an application of LWD, but that decision seemed to confirm the worst fears of 
Lilly’s critics.  In Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc. (Enzo I),74 the inventors had 
discovered three naturally-occurring DNA sequences (derived from the genome of N. 
gonorroheae, the pathogenic bacteria that causes gonorrhea) that were useful as 
hybridization probes for distinguishing between N. gonorroheae and N. meningitides, a
closely related but non-pathogenic bacteria.  The DNA sequences served as useful tools 
for diagnosing patients infected with gonorrhea, while avoiding false positives associated 
with the use of probes that could not distinguish between the two species of bacteria, and 
the inventors filed a patent application claiming the three sequences.  
The inventors apparently understood that a patent limited to the three sequences 
would afford only narrow protection, and could easily be designed around.75 For 
example, each of the three sequences was relatively long, ranging from 850 to 1300 bases 
in length,76 substantially longer than would be required to serve as functional probes.  
Given these starting sequences, one would expect a PHOSITA to be able to identify 
fragments of the three sequences (subsequences), or mutated variants of the three 
sequences, that would retain the functional utility of the full-length sequences.  
Furthermore, aided by the inventors’ disclosure, a PHOSITA could likely identify other 
 
74 285 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (vacated 323 F.3d 956). 
75 See generally Holman, supra note 44. 
76 285 F.3d at 1024. 
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DNA sequences from the N. gonorroheae genome able to distinguish between the two 
species of bacteria, i.e., structurally distinct albeit functionally equivalent substitutes for 
the three specifically identified DNA sequences.  In an attempt to preclude these 
possibilities, the inventors patented their invention broadly, claiming not only the three 
sequences but functionally equivalent variants.  In particular, the patent included a claim 
encompassing subsequences and “mutated” variants of the specifically disclosed 
sequences retaining the ability to distinguish between the two bacteria. An even broader 
claim recited, in purely functional terms, essentially any polynucleotide capable of 
distinguishing between the two bacteria, i.e., without any structural limitations on the 
sequence. 
Prior to filing the patent application, the inventors did not determine the chemical 
structures of the three DNA sequences.  They did, however, deposit samples of the DNA 
sequences with the American Type Culture Collection (ATCC), a publicly accessible 
depository for biological samples.  While this did not explicitly make the structures of the 
sequences public, it did in principle enable the public to determine the structures of the 
sequences, which could be accomplished by obtaining samples from the ATCC and using 
conventional molecular biotechnology techniques to determine the structures of the 
deposited sequences.  In the patent, the applicants described and claimed the DNA 
sequences by reference to the deposited samples, providing no structural description of 
the molecules.  The PTO found that the deposits were sufficient to fulfill the disclosure 
requirements of section 112, and granted the patent.77 
77Note that Enzo’s patent issued in 1990, long before Lilly, and at a time when the use of biological 
deposits to satisfy the Section 112 disclosure requirements had long been sanctioned by the courts and PTO 
procedure.  U.S. Patent No. 4, 900, 659.  The use of deposit was thought of as being necessary, and 
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In Enzo I, a divided panel of the Federal Circuit upheld a district court’s 
determination, as a matter of law, that LWD could not be satisfied with respect to a 
claimed DNA sequence by a deposit that failed to explicitly disclose the sequence’s 
chemical structure.  The court summarily dismissed the patentee’s argument that 
“possession” is the ultimate hallmark of adequate written description, and that the 
deposits clearly demonstrated the inventors’ actual, physical possession of the claimed 
DNA sequences.  According to the court in Enzo I, mere physical possession is not 
necessarily enough to satisfy LWD.78 
The court went on to cite a number of policy concerns that would arise if mere 
deposit were sufficient to satisfy LWD.  In particular, the court noted that without a 
“written” description of a DNA sequence a patent examiner would not be able to 
determine whether or not the sequence is new or nonobvious, and hence such a 
description was necessary in order to assure a proper examination.79 The court also 
found that a mere deposit provided insufficient notice to potential infringers as to the 
scope of the claim - “to require the public to go to a public depository and perform 
experiments to identify an invention is not consistent with the statutory requirement to 
describe one’s invention in the specification.” 80 
Both of these policy concerns would seem to be legitimate.  In practice, it would 
be impossible for a patent examiner to determine whether the deposited sequences fell 
within the prior art, because the examiner would have no way of knowing the identity of 
 
sufficient, for the enablement of inventions involving biological materials that could not be enabled by 
other means. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.801-809 (2006). 
78 285 F.3d at 1020-21. 
79 Id.at 1022. 
80 Id.
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the sequences.  The PTO has no capability for sequencing deposited biological samples.  
And it is clearly burdensome to require members of the public to obtain and determine 
the structure for the deposited samples in order to figure out whether they might infringe 
the patent.  Indeed, if determining the sequences for the deposits is truly a routine 
exercise, would it not make more sense to put the burden upon the patentee to determine 
the sequences, than to put the burden on any third party concerned with avoiding 
infringement? 
In any event, while Enzo I faithfully followed Lilly, and did address the policy 
concerns expressed by the court, the decision also raised a number of troubling policy 
concerns of its own.  Some of these were noted by Judge Dyk in his dissent to Enzo I.
For example, he noted that many biotechnology patents had been filed, prosecuted and 
issued under a regime wherein it was understood that deposit of DNA sequences was 
sufficient to satisfy 112, and the unfairness of disrupting the settled expectations of all 
these inventors by essentially changing the rules late in the game and introducing a 
completely new disclosure requirement, effectively invalidating a host of issued 
biotechnology patents.81 
4. Enzo II and the Demise of Strict Lilly Written Description 
Enzo petitioned for an en banc rehearing of Enzo I. Perhaps to avoid en banc 
reconsideration of the LWD doctrine, the panel that decided Enzo I vacated its original 
opinion, replacing it with Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc. (Enzo II). 82 Enzo II 
reversed the district court’s decision, and to a large extent repudiated Enzo I and Lilly 
itself. 
 
81 Id. at 1028-29.  
82 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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In particular, Enzo II clearly rejects the idea that LWD requires a disclosure of 
structure for DNA inventions, holding as a matter of law that structure is not required 
when a claimed DNA molecule is made publicly accessible by means of deposit.83 In 
justifying its flip-flop, the court noted the long tradition of inventors using biological 
deposits to satisfy the enablement requirement, the practical difficulties of describing 
unique biological materials in words, the potential for disruption of the settled 
expectations of biotechnology patent owners, and that the structures for the three DNA 
sequences “may not have been reasonably obtainable, and in any event were not known 
to Enzo when it filed its application in 1986.”84 Essentially, in Enzo II the court finds 
that the technical obstacles to determining DNA structure from a deposit justify the use of 
deposit to satisfy LWD, while in Enzo I the court had pointed to those very same 
technical obstacles as policy justifications for finding deposit inadequate to satisfy 
LWD.85 Enzo II holds that the necessary “possession” can be demonstrated by a showing 
that a PHOSITA would be able to predictably derive the DNA structures from the 
deposits using standard methodology, i.e., the LWD inquiry is effectively collapsed into a 
test for enablement.86 
The court then went even further, holding that extremely broad claims 
encompassing any functional substitute for the three deposited sequences, unconstrained 
by any structural limitations, might comply with the written description requirement if 
the deposits “indicate the patentee has invented species sufficient to constitute the 
 
83 Id. at 966. 
84 Id.
85 285 F.3d at 1022. 
86 Id. at 965-66. 
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genera.”87 The court also held that the claims to subsequences and mutated variants of 
the disclosed sequences satisfy LWD if the deposited samples “demonstrate possession” 
of the claimed subsequences and mutated variants.88 As is so often the case in 
subsequent Federal Circuit decisions applying LWD, the court provides no guidance for 
the district court with respect to what criteria it should use in its assessment of 
“demonstrated possession” and “invention of species sufficient to constitute the genera.” 
Shortly after Enzo II, a commentator noted that Enzo I was decided in a manner 
entirely consistent with Lilly, and that if Enzo I was indeed wrongly decided, as the court 
implicitly acknowledged in vacating the decision, then logically Lilly itself must be 
wrong.89 I believe that history has borne out this assessment of the import of the Enzo 
decisions.  In retrospect, it is clear that since Enzo II the significance of LWD as a 
distinct doctrine of patentability has been on a steady decline, and that the courts have for 
the most part limited the holding in Lilly to the facts of that case.90 
Although the court’s effective reversal of Enzo I avoided exposing LWD to the 
scrutiny of an en banc Federal Circuit, three judges on the court did dissent from the 
decision not to rehear the case en banc, including Judge Rader, the court’s most vocal 
critic of LWD.91 These judges asserted that the development of a distinct written 
description requirement outside its original context of policing new matter was wrong 
and should be reversed.92 A fourth member of the court, Judge Dyk, who wrote a strong 
dissent in Enzo I, also clearly opposes an interpretation of LWD that would require a 
 
87 Id. at 967 
88 At 966 
89 MARTIN J. ADELMAN, 3-2 PATENT LAW PERSPECTIVES § 2.9 (2004). 
90 See infra Part IV.  See also, 314 F.3d at 1361) (Clevenger, R., dissenting) (“the majority …  verges on 
confining Eli Lilly to its facts.”). 
91 323 F.3d at 976. 
92 Id. at 976-82. 
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disclosure of structure as a requirement of patentability, and questions the existence of 
written description as a distinct requirement of patentability applicable to original claims.  
However, he was of the opinion that Enzo was not the appropriate case to address the 
issue.93 
IV. A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW OF LILLY WRITTEN DESCRIPTION IN THE COURTS 
AND PTO 
The primary objective of this article is to provide a comprehensive survey of all 
publicly available decisions of the Federal Courts and the PTO Board of Patent Appeal 
and Interferences (BPAI)94 pertaining to LWD.  In keeping with this objective, I pursued 
a search strategy designed to be as comprehensive as reasonably possible.  Details of the 
search strategy are provided in the Appendix.  The relatively large number of decisions 
considered necessitates a succinct treatment for many of the cases.  The inventions 
involve complex technology, and the decisions are typically driven by the facts of the 
case; readers seeking a richer understanding of some of the complex technologies at issue 
in these decisions are encouraged to refer to the actual decisions and/or biotechnology 
texts, treatises, and primers, of which there are many.95 
In summarizing the decisions, I focus primarily upon the following issues:  (1) the 
extent to which the LWD is (or is not) being applied as a “super-enablement” 
 
93Id. at 975-76. 
94 A patent applicant may appeal an examiner's claim rejection to the PTO's Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences (BPAI). The Board may affirm or reverse the examiner's action and may enter a new ground 
of rejection. From an adverse ruling by the Board, the applicant may either appeal on the record to the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or file a de novo civil suit to obtain a patent against the 
Commissioner (Director) in the District Court for the District of Columbia. CHISUM ON PATENTS § 11.06.  
See also, In re Zurko, 142 F.3d 1447, 1456-57 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (providing a good review of 
BPAI procedure). 
95 See, e.g., Karl DRLICA, UNDERSTANDING DNA AND GENE CLONING: A GUIDE FOR THE CURIOUS (3d ed. 
1997); MOLECULAR BIOLOGY AND BIOTECHNOLOGY: A COMPREHENSIVE DESK REFERENCE (Robert A. 
Meyers, ed., 1995); BENJAMIN LEWIN, GENES VII (2000); and JAMES D. WATSON ET AL., RECOMBINANT 
DNA (2d ed.1992). 
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requirement; (2) the extent to which LWD is being applied in a manner that requires a 
disclosure of chemical structure, either explicitly or implicitly; and (3) the extent to 
which LWD is being applied in a manner that limits claim scope, particularly for 
biotechnology and/or chemical inventions.  In other words, I focus upon the primary 
concerns that have been expressed in connection with the effect of LWD on the ability of 
biotechnology inventors to achieve adequate patent protection for their inventions.96 
In Section A, I begin by summarizing the many decisions where the courts and 
BPAI have rejected LWD challenges to claim validity, illustrating the extent to which 
LWD is not preventing inventors from claiming biotechnology inventions in broad and/or 
functional terms.  Then, in Section B, I review the relatively infrequent decisions where 
claims have been invalidated under LWD, pointing out the generally expansive scope of 
the invalidated claims relative the scope of disclosure, and the resultant enablement 
issues. 
A. Decisions Rejecting Lilly Written Description Challenges to Claim Validity 
1. LWD in the Federal Circuit 
Subsequent to Lilly, the Federal Circuit has on six occasions explicitly rejected 
LWD-based challenges to claims validity, with five of the six decisions involving broad 
biotechnology-related claims.  The first of these, Enzo II, was discussed above, and the 
others are reviewed in this section. 
 
96 There are a number of traditional written description decisions relating to chemical and biotechnology 
patents which are not considered in this article, in keeping with my objective of focusing on the LWD 
branch of written description doctrine. See, e.g., Chiron v. Genentech, 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004) and 
Union Oil Co. of California v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
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Amgen v. HMR, decided the year after Enzo II, involved multiple patents relating 
to the cloning and expression of human erythropoietin (EPO) in recombinant, cultured 
mammalian cells.97 Amgen scientists accomplished this feat by attaching a viral 
promoter sequence98 adjacent to the cloned human EPO gene, and then introducing the 
recombinant genetic construct into cultured Chinese Hamster Ovary (CHO) cells, which 
allowed for the large scale production of this potent human therapeutic.99 In 
understanding the case, it is critical to note that Amgen’s patent disclosure related to the 
expression of an exogenous gene, i.e., a human gene introduced into a foreign (hamster) 
cell, while the claims encompassed essentially any vertebrate cell containing a 
recombinant EPO gene-promoter construct.100 
The Federal Circuit upheld a district court’s determination that the claims were 
not invalid under LWD.101 Note the expansive scope of the claims, and the lack of any 
meaningful structural constraints.  For example, the claims were found to encompass (and 
to be infringed by) a human recombinant cell expressing its own native EPO gene, i.e., an 
endogenous gene, as opposed to the exogenous gene described in the patent 
specification.102 The recombinant expression of an endogenous human gene was not 
mentioned in the patent specification, nor could it have even been accomplished using the 
technology available at the time the patent application was filed, i.e, this is an “after-
 
97 See supra note 26. 
98 A promoter is a DNA sequence that regulates the expression of an adjacent gene. 
99 Prior to this invention, EPO had to be isolated from human urine, and could not be produced in sufficient 
quantities to be useful as a drug. 
100 314 F.3d at 1322-23. The claims also encompassed methods of using such cells to produce recombinant 
EPO, the recombinant EPO protein itself, and other facets of the invention.   
101 Id. at 1334.  The majority also found these claims did not violate the enablement requirement.  See 
supra note 31. 
102 Id, at 1351-52, 1349. 
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arising technology.”103 Moreover, Amgen’s patent specification pointed to "freedom 
from association with human proteins" as a specific advantage of its invention, an 
advantage that could only be achieved by expression of an exogenous EPO gene.104 
The court’s LWD analysis is substantively indistinguishable from traditional 
enablement analysis, focusing upon how “easy” it would be for one of skill in the art to 
figure out how to adapt the methodology to other cell types105 (compare with “undue 
experimentation” standard), and explicitly endorsing the districts court’s statement that 
claims encompassing “future developments of [the] process that might alter or even 
improve how the same product is made” do not violate LWD106 (compare with the same 
position taken with respect to enablement in In re Fisher and Hormone Research 
Foundation Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.).107 The court also finds the precedent of Lilly and 
Enzo II “inapposite to this case because the claim terms at issue here are not new or 
unknown biological materials” or “previously unknown DNA sequences.”108 Of course, 
the claims are directed to novel recombinant cells, but the court seems suggests that 
LWD is relevant only to newly discovered, naturally-occurring genetic sequences, not to 
novel recombinations of genetic elements, such as the recombinant cells at issue here.  As 
described below, other courts have generally shared this restrictive interpretation of 
LWD. 
 
103 Id. at 1331-32.  Transkaryotic therapies, Inc., a defendant in the case, even obtained their own patent on 
the technology for expressing an endogenous gene in this manner, years after Amgen filed its patent 
applications.  Brief of Appellants Transkaryotic Therapies, Inc. and Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 2001 
WL 34633545, *16-17. 
104 Id. at 1331.  Expression of endogenous EPO involves expression of human EPO in a human cell, 
inevitably leading to some association with human proteins. 
105 Id. at 1331. 
106 Id. at 1332. 
107 See supra Part II. 
108 Id. at 1332. 
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In a strongly worded dissent, Judge Clevenger took issue with the majority’s 
interpretation of LWD, pointing out that Amgen’s claims have no meaningful limitation 
with respect to how the recombinant EPO is expressed, or the structure of the EPO-
producing cells, so long as EPO is non-naturally occurring and produced in vertebrate 
cells.109 In his view, the claims are analogous to a claim reciting any “machine that 
makes polymer X, wherein the machine comprises means for controlling how much 
polymer X is made.”110 He found that the majority opinion, in dismissing LWD on the 
grounds that no undisclosed DNA molecule appears in the case “verges on confining Eli 
Lilly to its facts.”111 
It bears noting that there were a number of claims directed to recombinant EPO 
protein per se which were at issue in the case but for some reason failed to trigger any 
sort of LWD analysis, including claims to EPO “not isolated from human urine” or EPO 
“having glycosylation pattern that differs from EPO purified from human urine.”112 
These are extremely broad claims, lacking any structural limitation other than a negative 
limitation, i.e., the claims encompass any and all recombinant EPO proteins, excluding 
only the naturally-occurring form of the protein that was in the prior art.  This clearly 
invokes LWD, but the majority fails to even acknowledge the issue, and the dissent does 
so only tangentially. 
In Moba B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc.,113 one of only two Federal Circuit 
LWD decisions not relating to biotechnology or chemistry, the court upheld a jury’s 
 
109 Id. at 1359-60. 
110 Id. at 1360. 
111 Id. at 1361. 
112 Id. at 1322. 
113 325 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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determination that claims directed to a machine for processing hen eggs was not invalid 
for failure to comply with LWD.  The decision provides a good historical description of 
the development of the two distinct forms of the written description requirement, and 
defines the test for compliance with either prong as essentially being one of 
“possession.”114 
The court also implicitly finds that, in general, the test for possession can be 
shown by enablement.  In particular, the court points out that in Enzo II and Amgen v. 
HMR possession (and hence compliance with LWD) was satisfied by a showing of 
enablement, and that likewise possession of the egg processing machine at issue in Moba 
was adequately disclosed by an enabling disclosure.115 This merger of the tests for LWD 
and enablement is reiterated in many subsequent cases, perhaps most explicitly in 
Lizardtech.116 
The next Federal Circuit decision rejecting a LWD challenge to claim validity, 
Capon v. Eshhar,117 involved an appeal of the BPAI’s decision in an interference 
contest.118 The claims at issue recited a genus of chimeric genes119 comprising a first 
segment encoding some portion of an antibody capable of binding an antigen, and a 
second segment encoding at least some portion of a protein that (1) is expressed on the 
surface of cells of the immune system and (2) triggers activation and/or proliferation of 
 
114 Id. at 1319-1320. 
115 Id.at 1321. 
116 See infra Part IV. 
117 418 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
118 An interference is a contest under 35 U.S.C. 135(a) between an application and either another 
application or a patent. An interference is declared to assist the Director of the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office in determining priority, that is, which party first invented the commonly claimed 
invention within the meaning of 35 U.S.C. 102(g)(1).” MANUAL OF PATENTING EXAMINER PROCEDURE § 
2301 (2005). 
119 A chimeric gene is an artificial gene that combines segments of DNA in a way that does not occur in 
nature. 418 F.3d at 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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the cells.120 In its decision, the BPAI presumed the claims to be enabled, but found them 
to be invalid under LWD for failure of the patent specification to disclose a complete 
chemical structurefor any species of chimeric gene falling within the scope of the 
claims.121 The board cited Lilly and Enzo I as controlling precedent, 122 and interpreted 
those decisions as requiring a specific disclosure of the chemical structure of at least one 
species falling within the scope of the claim, i.e., the BPAI correctly applied LWD in 
precisely the strict manner Lilly and Enzo I seemed to require. 
On appeal, a unanimous panel of the Federal Circuit vacated the BPAI’s decision.  
The court, citing Enzo II, specifically rejected the BPAI’s interpretation of LWD 
requiring an explicit disclosure of at least one chimeric gene sequence falling within the 
scope of the claim.  The court found that the structures of exemplary genetic sequences 
that could function as the first and second segments of the chimeric gene were known at 
the time the patent application was filed, as were the structures of linker sequences and 
techniques for joining the two segments by means of the linkers, and that this disclosure 
was sufficient to satisfy LWD.123 In particular, the court faulted the BPAI for 
interpreting LWD as requiring a “re-analysis” of known sequences, i.e., the elements of 
the chimeric construct, since the structures of the elements of the chimera, including the 
linker, were disclosed in the specifications and/or known in the prior art at the time of 
filing.124 
120 Id. at 1351-52.   
121 This is notable as the only instance where a court or BPAI explicitly treated LWD as a super-enablement 
requirement, and the decision was subsequently reversed by the Federal Circuit. 
122 For some reason, the board failed to take into account the fact that Enzo I had been vacated and replaced 
by Enzo II. This is somewhat strange, since the board decision is dated March 26, 2003, and Enzo II was 
decided July 15, 2002. 
123 Id. at 1357-58.   
124 Id. 
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The extent of the court’s decision was fairly limited, holding that LWD did not 
require an explicit disclosure of structure for any species falling within the scope of the 
claim, but remanding the case to the BPAI to determine whether LWD had been satisfied 
with respect to the “full scope” of the particular claim at issue. The court provided some 
limited guidance to the BPAI to consider making that determination, but as was the case 
in Amgen v. HMR, the criteria do not appear to differ substantively from traditional 
enablement analysis. For example, the court states that, with respect to LWD, “the 
determination of what is needed to support generic claims to biological subject matter 
depends on a variety of factors, such as the existing knowledge in the particular field, the 
extent and content of the prior art, the maturity of the science or technology, the 
predictability of the aspect at issue, and other considerations appropriate to the subject 
matter.”125 There is no meaningful distinction between these criteria and some of the 
Wands factors, which include the state of the prior art, the relative skill of those in the art, 
and the predictability or unpredictability of the art.126 
Later, the court states that “the Board's repeated observation that the full scope of 
all of the claims appears to be ‘enabled’ cannot be reconciled with the Board's objection 
that [the claims do not satisfy LWD],” and observes that “the legal criteria of enablement 
and written description are related and are often met by the same disclosure.”127 This is 
yet another example of the merging of court merging the tests for enablement and LWD.  
The claims at issue are expansive in scope, and lack any meaningful structural 
 
125 Id. at 1359. 
126 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  The Federal Circuit views the Wands factors as the 
primary test for assessing a patent claim for compliance with the enablement requirement. 
127 418 F.3d at 1360. 
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limitation.128 Clearly this panel of the Federal Circuit did not interpret LWD as imposing 
any strict structure-based limitations on broad, functional claiming of biomolecules. 
Shortly after Capon, the Federal Circuit decided Invitrogen Corp. v. Clontech 
Laboratories,129 where the patented invention at issue in involved the genetic engineering 
of a functionally modified form of a protein known as a reverse transcriptase (RT).  RTs 
are naturally-occurring enzymes that possess two distinct catalytic activities, referred to 
as the DNA polymerase and the RNase H activities. 130 Invitrogen scientists discovered 
that by deleting a section of the RT protein (using a technique known as deletion 
mutagenesis) they could make RT*, an RT variant that retains DNA polymerase activity, 
albeit with substantially reduced RNase activity.131 This variant proved superior to 
natural RT in a variety of molecular biology applications, i.e., RT* is useful as a research 
tool. Based on the disclosure of a single example of an RT*,132 derived from a specific 
strain of retrovirus and generated by a specific methodology, they obtained a patent 
covering any RT*, derived from any retrovirus, yeast, Neurospora, Drosophila, primate 
or rodent, generated by any methodology, including functionally distinct or superior 
variants.133 
128 The first segment of the claimed genus of chimeric genes essentially encompasses any antibody or 
antibody fragment capable of binding an antigen.  Generally any protein or relatively large molecule (and 
in many cases even small molecules) can function as an antigen, and generally any antigen is recognized by 
a host of structurally and functionally distinct antibodies, so the possibilities with regard to the first 
segment are truly astronomical.  The second segment is a protein defined in terms of location of expression 
and biological function, and would likewise cover an open-ended genus of functionally related molecules, 
including as of yet undiscovered proteins that would satisfy the defining criteria.  Id. at 1352. 
129 429 F.3d 1052 (Fed. Cir 2005). 
130 An enzyme is a protein that accelerates (catalyzes) a chemical reaction without itself being consumed. 
DRLICA at 243. 
131The designation “RT*” is the author’s, and is used as shorthand to designate any RT variant that retains 
DNA polymerase activity but with substantially reduced RNase activity. 
132 U.S. Patent 6,070,499, figure 6. 
133 429 F.3d at 1071-72. 
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Clontech made its own version of RT* by a different technique, known as point 
mutagenesis.134 Clearly, the different techniques would lead to structurally distinct 
products, and perhaps to different function.135 In particular, it might well be the case that 
the product of point mutagenesis might have superior function relative to the product of 
deletion mutagenesis.  Clontech argued that the Invitrogen patent application did not 
disclose or enable the production of RT* by point mutagenesis, and that the claims should 
be interpreted as not encompassing their RT* made by point mutagenesis or, in the 
alternative, if interpreted broadly enough as to encompass their product, the claims are 
invalid for violation of LWD.  In particular, Clontech argued that the claim violated 
LWD for describing the claimed genus of RT* molecules in essentially functional terms, 
with no meaningful structural limitation.136 
The district court held on a motion for summary judgment that the claim was not 
invalid under LWD, and the Federal Circuit affirmed that decision.  The Federal Circuit 
acknowledged that the claimed genus of RT* proteins was defined solely in terms of 
function, but held that there was a sufficient, known relationship between the structure 
and function of retroviral RTs to satisfy LWD.137 However, in this regard the court’s 
focus appears to be misdirected, for the claim do not recite naturally-occurring retroviral 
RTs, but non-naturally occurring RT*s from a variety of species, of which only a single 
embodiment was disclosed.  Beyond that limited disclosure, there is no evidence in the 
 
134 Point mutagenesis involves changing single amino acid in the a protein sequence, in contrast with the 
deletion mutagenesis technique employed by Invitrogen, which entails deleting an entire stretch of amino 
acids from the sequence.   
135 Deletion mutagenesis is a more crude technique than point mutagenesis, since it involves excising a 
relatively large stretch of the protein’s amino acid chain.  The resulting structural difference might easily 
result in functional differences between RT*s derived by different methods.   
136 429 F.3d at 1072-73. 
137 Id. at 1073. 
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record of any disclosure of a relationship between structure and function in other species 
of RT*, and in particular no suggestion of disclosure which would allow one to produce a 
RT* variant by point mutagenesis such as the one produced by Clontech.  The claim 
literally covers improved RT* variants sharing little structural similarity with the 
disclosed RT* and substantially distinct and/or superior functional characteristics.  In this 
case, LWD is simply not functioning as any meaningful limitation on claim scope. 
Note also that while an enablement challenge to the claim’s validity was also 
rejected, the court could have easily found the broad claim invalid for lack of enablement 
by applying that requirement in the stringent manner to be observed in cases like Amgen 
v. Chugai.138 In fact, by comparison the claim invalidated in Amgen v. Chugai was 
actually much narrower than the claim in Invitrogen. The Amgen claim was limited to 
EPO variants having “duplicative” function with respect to the disclosed EPO, while the 
claims in Invitrogen literally cover functionally distinct and/or improved variations of the 
disclosed RT*.  Likewise, the Amgen claim is implicitly limited to variants of a single 
disclosed EPO, while the claim in Invitrogen literally encompasses RT* variants derived 
from any of a wide range of organisms, including organisms for which the RT protein 
had yet to be characterized. 
The court attempted to reconcile its decision with previous LWD decisions, 
noting, for example, that in Lilly not one single structure was provided for a sequence 
falling within the claims, while in this case a single structure was provided.139 However, 
on this point the court misreads Lilly; recall that in Lilly a claim directed to the genus of 
mammalian insulin genes was found invalid under LWD even though the structure of the 
 
138 See supra Part II. 
139 429 F.3d at 1073. 
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rat gene was disclosed, i.e., a species falling within the scope of the claim.  A more 
principled distinction between the two cases, which the Invitrogen court did not explicitly 
make, is that in Lilly the genus encompassed naturally occurring genetic sequences, while 
in Invitrogen the claim is directed to a genus of non-naturally occurring, synthetically 
derived biomolecules.140 
Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis involved another appeal of a BPAI interference 
decision.141 Inglis’s patent specification described a method of making a safer attenuated 
virus vaccine that involved deleting an essential gene from the viral genome, and 
producing the virus in a host cell expressing the essential gene (and thereby providing the 
function of the essential gene necessary for the viability of the modified virus).  The 
patent specification specifically described and exemplified the invention with respect to 
herpes virus.  However, the specification included some passing references to a variety of 
other types of viruses, including poxvirus,142 and a brief statement that the disclosed 
methods were not limited to herpes virus vaccines, but could also be applied generally to 
other viruses.143 
Subsequent to the initial filing date, Inglis filed patent claims specifically directed 
to poxvirus vaccines generated by the methodology, claiming priority to the originally 
filed patent specification.  In particular, Inglis claimed any vaccine comprising a 
defective poxvirus whose genome had been modified by deletion of an essential gene the 
 
140 This distinction between natural and synthetic biomolecules can be seen reflected in a number of other 
Federal Circuit decisions, particularly Invitrogen (broad genus of synthetic genetic sequences satisfies 
LWD) and In re Wallach (claim to naturally-occurring genetic sequences invalid under LWD), discussed 
supra.
141 448 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
142 Poxvirus is a genus of related viruses, including small pox and vaccinia virus.  Human Virology at 
Stanford, http://www.stanford.edu/group/virus/pox/2000/vaccinia_virus.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2006) 
143 448 F.3d at 1364(Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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function of which could be replaced by a host cell expressing the gene.144 The question 
on appeal was whether the original patent specification, with its limited disclosure with 
regard to poxvirus, provided adequate support for the claim to satisfy LWD.  Falkner 
argued that it did not, pointing out that the specification provided no specific example of 
a poxvirus vaccine and no specific teaching with respect to how one would make a 
poxvirus vaccine falling within the scope of the claim, or any teaching regarding the 
genome of poxvirus or the identification of essential genes.145 In fact, the specification 
stated that as of the date the specification was filed no poxvirus vaccine had ever been 
made.146 
However, the Federal Circuit found that the claim complied with LWD, pointing 
out that the structures of some poxviruses and their essential regions were known to a 
PHOSITA, and citing Capon for the proposition that LWD does not require the “re-
analysis” of known structures.147 However, the claim is not limited to only known 
poxviruses, but literally extends to any poxvirus, including as of yet undiscovered strains 
of poxvirus.  The specification does not provide any structural description for the massive 
number of unreported poxvirus, nor does it specifically identify the essential regions of 
the poxvirus genome whose function could be provided by growth of virus in a host cell 
expressing that region.  Essentially, the court finds that information in the public domain 
at the time the application was filed would have enabled a PHOSITA to make some 
species falling within the scope of the claim, and this was enough to satisfy LWD.  
According tot the court, LWD does not require a structure for any species falling within 
 
144 Id. at 1360. 
145 Id. at 1365-66. 
146 Id. at 1367, n.10. 
147 Id. at 1367. 
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the scope of the claim, nor does it require the actual production of any species falling 
within the scope of the claim i.e., actual reduction of practice is not required. 
With regard to claim scope, the court merely points to the fact that a number of 
poxviruses and their essential genes were known to the PHOSITA, without ever 
explicitly addressing the scope of the claim relative to scope of disclosure, or the lack of 
meaningful structural limitation on the claim.  In Lilly, the court seemed to require that a 
broad genus claim to genetic sequences be supported by a representative number of 
samples, or by the identification of common structural features that distinguish the 
claimed genus.  However, in Falkner the court specifically rejects the notion that any 
specific examples are required to support a broad genus claim, and finds that the 
knowledge of some relationship between structure and function in species falling within 
the scope of the claim is sufficient to satisfy LWD, without engaging in any analysis 
regarding the scope of the claims relative to the limited number of species for which any 
relationship between structure and function was known.148 
In view of the breadth of the claim and lack of structural limitation, the claim 
could have been found invalid for insufficient enablement.  The poxvirus family is vast, 
including numerous distinct viruses capable of infecting vertebrates and invertebrates.149 
The classification poxvirus would also presumably encompass the many poxvirus species 
that have yet to be discovered and/or characterized,150 hence the claims cover vaccines 
against viruses not even known at the time the application was filed, and vaccines with 
substantially superior function, none of which could have been made based on the 
 
148 Id. at 1366. 
149 Human Virology at Stanford, http://www.poxvirus.org/index.asp (last visited Sept. 6, 2006)   
150 Id. 
41
original disclosure without engaging in undue experimentation.  For example, in In re 
Wright, a similar broad claim directed to viral vaccines was found overly broad and 
hence invalid for lack of enablement.151 
2. LWD in the District Courts 
My search identified ten district court decisions, not the subject of a subsequently 
reported appellate decision, wherein the court rejected LWD challenges to claim validity.  
Each case is discussed in this section.  Three of the cases involved a determination by the 
court after a bench trial, and seven involved a denial of a motion for summary judgment.  
In one of the decisions denying a defendant’s motion for summary judgment of 
invalidity, the court also granted patentee’s summary judgment motion with regard to 
LWD, finding the claims to satisfy LWD as a matter of law. 
In Streck v. Beckman Coulter, the defendant argued on motion for summary 
judgment that a claim reciting “analogs or surrogates” for white blood cells failed to 
satisfy LWD.152 The district court rejected this argument, holding that the “claim is not 
so devoid of clarity that there is no means by which those skilled in the art could 
ascertain the scope of the claim.”153 In basing its decision on the clarity of the claim, the 
court appears to have blurred the line between LWD and the definiteness requirement of 
35 USC 112, second paragraph. The court also posited that LWD is restricted to genetic 
sequences and biotechnology inventions, and in not applicable to cells.154 
151 Supra Part II. 
152 2002 WL 1012965 (D. Neb. 2002). 
153 Id. at *3. 
154Id. at *5, n.5. 
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In Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs,155 the claim at issue was directed to a chimeric gene 
comprising two elements: (1) a promoter sequence derived from a cauliflower mosaic 
virus (CaMV),156 and (2) a “structural sequence which is heterologous with respect to the 
promoter.”157 The CaMV promoter element was defined so as to generically encompass 
two classes of promoters that are associated with many of the virus’s genes (in particular, 
the CaMV 35S and 19S promoters).158 Thus, the definition includes a large genus of 
genetic sequences, unrestrained by any explicit structural limitation.  The second element 
of the chimeric gene could essentially be any gene, from any source, that does not occur 
naturally in association with the CaMV promoter element.  The claim scope is very 
broad, analogous to the chimeric gene claim at issue in Capon. In granting a Monsanto 
motion for summary judgment, the district court held that the disclosure of a few species 
falling within the scope of the claim satisfied LWD as a matter of law, thus anticipating 
the Federal Circuit’s decision in Capon.
In Regents of University of California  v. Monsanto Co., the district court denied a 
motion for summary judgment seeking to invalidate a claim directed to a specific 
nucleotide sequence for failure to comply with LWD.159 The motion was based on the 
defendant’s assertion that the claim listed the wrong DNA sequence.160 In denying the 
motion, the judge noted that the alleged error resulted in a silent mutation, so would not 
change the sequence of the protein encoded by the gene, and that in any event the 
 
155 342 F.Supp.2d 584 (N.D.Miss.,2004).  
156 A promoter is a genetic sequence that controls the expression of a gene with which it is in close 
proximity. 
157 The structural sequence is essentially a gene not normally associated with the CaMV promoter.  342 
F.Supp.2d at 591. 
158 Id. 
159 2005 WL 3454107 (N.D. Cal. 2005). 
160 Apparently a typographical error that occurred in drafting the patent application.  Id. at *19. 
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patentee had made a deposit of the claimed sequence accessible to the public, which 
under Enzo II satisfies LWD.161 
In Pfizer Inc. v. Ranbaxy Laboratories Ltd.,162 the defendant Ranbaxy argued that 
the patent claims, which recited a molecule defined in terms of a generic chemical 
formula, should be interpreted narrowly as only covering racemic mixtures of the 
molecule.163 Because they proposed marketing a purified enantiomer of the molecule, 
under this construction they would not have infringed the patent.164 In the alternative, 
they argued that if the claims were interpreted broadly so as to encompass purified 
enantiomers, the claim was invalid under LWD for failure to individually describe 
specific enantiomers of the claimed compounds, and for failure to disclose any method 
for making the enantiomers.165 In a bench trial, the district court rejected this argument, 
pointing out that the patent specification expressly indicates that the generic formula 
includes all trans-enantiomers and that methods of resolving racemates into their 
respective enantiomers are well known to one of skill in the art.166 Thus, the court 
interpreted LWD as not requiring an explicit disclosure of structure, and gave the claims 
a broad reading.  Pfizer v. Ranbaxy is notable in that it is the only decision, in either the 
courts of BPAI, wherein the issue of LWD was even raised in connection with a product 
claim directed to a chemical entity other than a biomolecule. 
 
161 Id. at *20 
162 405 F.Supp.2d 495 (D. Del. 2005). 
163 Ranbaxy was attempting to enter the market with a generic version of the cholesterol drug Lipitor, the 
largest selling pharmaceutical in history, by challenging the validity of Pfizer’s patent on the drug.   
164 405 F.Supp.2d at 502(D. Del. 2005). (“Scientific Background” section explains enantiomers, racemic 
mixtures, and related concepts) 
165 Id. at 505-06. 
166 Id. at 505. 
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In Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Cordis Corp., 167 the defendant moved for 
summary judgment that a claim directed to a method of treatment was invalid under 
LWD for defining a chemical therapeutic agent in purely functional terms.168 The claim 
is closely analogous to the claim at issue in Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle,169 as are 
the defendant’s arguments in the two cases.  However, in Boston Scientific the patent 
specification discloses a number of chemical therapeutic agents possessing the claimed 
function, as well as an assay to identify other compounds possessing the desired function, 
whereas in Rochester the specification failed to specifically identify a single compound 
possessing the required function.170 Based on this distinction, the district court denied 
defendant’s motion, holding that the issue of LWD was one of fact that could not be 
decided on summary judgment. 
In Kao Corp. v. Unilever U.S., Inc., the court in a bench trial held that claims 
directed to compositions and methods for unclogging skin pores were not invalid for 
inadequate LWD.171 
In Enzo Life Sciences, Inc. v. Digene Corp., defendant Digene argued on a motion 
for summary judgment that claims directed to a diagnostic methods involving the 
detection of a complex of hybridized nucleic acids comprising a “signaling domain” or a 
 
167 392 F.Supp.2d 676 (D.Del. 2005). 
168 The claim at issue reads: “A therapeutic method for preventing or treating a cardiovascular 
indication characterized by a decreased lumen diameter comprising administering to a mammal at 
risk of or afflicted with said cardiovascular indication, a cytostatic dose of a therapeutic agent, 
wherein the cytostatic dose is effective to increase the level of TGF-beta so as to inhibit smooth 
muscle cell proliferation, inhibit lipid accumulation, plaque stability, or any combination 
thereof.”  Id. at 679, n.2. 
169 See infra  n.246. 
170 392 F.Supp.2d at 683-84 (D.Del. 2005). 
171 334 F.Supp.2d 527, 550 (D. Del. 2004). 
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“capturing domain” were invalid under LWD.172 In particular, Digene focused on the 
lack of any ordinary meaning for the terms “signaling domain” and “capturing domain,” 
the failure of the specification to provide any definition for the terms, and the fact that the 
nucleic acids were defined in purely functional terms.173 Digene especially focused on 
the fact that the functional definition occurred at the point of novelty in the invention, i.e., 
the use of “signaling and capturing domains.”174 The court denied the motion for 
summary judgment, holding that the question of compliance with LWD was one of fact 
inappropriate for summary determination.  In support of its decision, the court pointed to 
a purported PHOSITA’s declaration proffered by Enzo.  The declaration identified 
various sections of the specification which indicated that one skilled in the art "would 
immediately recognize that the inventions claimed in [the patent] are fully described by 
the specification.”175 The court also rejected a motion for summary judgment on behalf 
of Enzo to find the patent not invalid under LWD, again finding that the determination 
involved a factual dispute unsuitable for summary disposition.176 
In Glaxo Wellcome, Inc. v. Eon Labs Mfg., Inc., a generic drug manufacturer 
moved for a summary judgment determination that claims directed to a sustained release 
version of the popular anti-depressant Wellbutrin were invalid under LWD177. The claim 
recited formulations comprising HPMC, which is a generic designation for a genus of 
related molecular polymers.  The substance of the LWD challenge sounded in 
enablement, with the defendant essentially arguing that the specification failed to 
 
172 305 F.Supp.2d 400 (D.Del. 2004). 
173 Id. at 403-04. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. at 404. 
176 Id. at 405. 
177 2003 WL 22004874 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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demonstrate that certain species falling within the claimed genus could actually be used 
to make a functional sustained release formulation.178 The court rejected the motion, 
pointing to an affidavit submitted by Glaxo’s expert stating that all versions of the 
polymer falling within the claimed genus would be capable of performing the desired 
function of forming a hydrogel and retarding release of the active ingredient from a 
sustained release matrix, which raised an issue of fact with respect to LWD 
compliance.179 
In Scanner Technologies Corp. v. Icos Vision Systems Corp., N.V., the court 
denied a LWD-based summary judgment challenge to a patent involving technology and 
processes to inspect electronic components, such as "ball array devices," which are used 
to conduct electrical impulses in electronic devices, citing the existence of a genuine 
issue of material fact.180 
In Genlyte Thomas Group LLC v. National Service Industries, Inc., the court 
denied a motion on summary judgment to invalidate claims directed to a “recessed 
lighting feature” for failure to comply with LWD. 181 The substance of the challenge 
implicates the definiteness requirement of 35 USC 112, second paragraph, rather than 
LWD, with the defendant alleging that the term “plastic,” as used in the claims was “too 
general to be useful.”182 
178 Id. at *1. 
179 Id. at *3. 
180 253 F.Supp.2d 624 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
181 262 F.Supp.2d 762 (W.D.Ky. 2003). 
182 Id. at 765. 
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Astra Aktiebolag v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc., involved generic drug 
companies seeking to invalidate patents claiming formulations of Prilosec,183 alleging 
that the claims were invalid for failure to comply with LWD with regard to a number of 
terms used in the claims.184 In a bench trial, the court rejected all LWD-based challenges 
to the claims. 
3. LWD in the BPAI 
My search identified 22 BPAI decisions, not the subject of a subsequently 
reported appellate decision addressing the LWD issue, wherein the board reversed an 
examiner’s LWD rejection. Each decision is discussed in this section, with cases grouped 
to some extent based on similarity of the claimed subject matter and pertinent issues of 
patentability. 
a. The Use of Open-Ended “Comprising” Language 
Inventors of novel biomolecules frequently broaden the scope of patent coverage 
by using “comprising” language to claim the molecule.185 For example, a claim directed 
to a polynucleotide “comprising” a specified DNA sequence is understood to encompass 
any larger DNA sequence that includes within its length the specifically disclosed 
sequence.186 Such claims are very broad in the sense that there are infinite possibilities 
for modification at either end of the recited sequence, and all of these variants would fall 
 
183 A highly profitable gastric acid inhibiting drug. 
184 222 F.Supp.2d 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
185 In the lexicon of patent law, ''comprising'' is a transition word that indicates that the claim is open, and 
hence infringement is not avoided by a product or process incorporating elements not recited in the claim.  
See, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 8.06. 
186 Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("’Comprising’ is a term of art used 
in claim language which means that the named elements are essential, but other elements may be added and 
still form a construct within the scope of the claim.”) 
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within the scope of the claim.187 Perhaps more problematic from a policy perspective, the 
use of comprising language allows the discoverer of only a fragment of a naturally-
occurring protein or polynucleotide to obtain a patent claim literally covering the full-
length protein or polynucleotide, as well as any larger construct comprising the full-
length molecule, such as a protein fusion or gene chimera. 
Some patent examiners have attempted to use LWD to thwart this approach, 
asserting that the disclosure of a biomolecule sequence does not support a claim 
encompassing biomolecules having additions to one or both ends of the disclosed 
sequence, particularly additions that might very well confer function not possessed by the 
originally disclosed sequence.  However, in the single BPAI decision I identified that 
addresses the issue, Ex parte Fisher, the board found that this use of comprising language 
generally does not raise LWD as an issue.188 
In Fisher, the board reversed an examiner’s LWD rejection of claims directed to 
any polynucleotide comprising a recited EST sequence,189 concluding (without 
explanation) that the disclosure of a specified sequence was enough to satisfy LWD for 
any molecule comprising that sequence.190 The board chose instead to invalidate the 
claims for lack of utility, a decision ultimately affirmed by the Federal Circuit.191 Of 
course, a problem with reliance on utility instead of LWD (or enablement) is that in cases 
where an EST does have some utility, the comprising language will still be available to 
 
187 Id.  Examples would include plasmids, genomes and other genetic constructs containing the specified 
sequence.   
188 72 USPQ2d 1020, 1028 (BPAI 2004) (Unpublished). 
189 An “expressed sequence tag,” or EST, is essentially a fragment of a full length gene. 
190 72 at 1028 (BPAI 2004) 
191 In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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leverage the discovery of a gene fragment into patent coverage for the full-length gene 
(and the vast number of other genetic variants that might also include the sequence). 
b. Percent Identity Claims 
Inventors of novel biomolecules typically seek patent claims encompassing not 
only that specific sequence, but also a broad genus of structurally and/or functionally 
related variants.  When used in conjunction with comprising language, as is almost 
always the case, such claims can be truly astronomical in scope. 
One of the most common approaches to achieving expansive scope of coverage 
around a disclosed biomolecule is to claim all molecules sharing some defined percent 
identity (or percent similarity) to the specific sequence actually discovered. 192 An 
example would be a claim reciting “a protein comprising an amino acid sequence sharing 
at least 90% identity with the amino acid sequence of SEQ ID NO. 1.”193 
The PTO’s Synopsis of Application of Written Description Guidelines (referred to 
herein as the “Written Description Guidelines,” or simply the “Guidelines”)194 
specifically sanction the use of percent identity claims of a reasonable scope.195 
However, patent examiners routinely reject what they perceive to be overly broad percent 
identity claims for violation of LWD.196 For example, in a typical scenario, a patent 
applicant files a patent application claiming all proteins sharing at least 70% identity to a 
recited amino acid sequence, the examiner rejects the claim for violation of LWD (and 
 
192 For a detailed discussion of the percent identity approach to claiming biomolecules, and a proposal for a 
superior alternative, See  HOLMAN supra n. 44. 
193 This claim is somewhat over-simplified.  For a more detailed explanation, See  HOLMAN supra n. 44. 
194 See Synopsis of Application of Written Description Guidelines, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/written.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2006). 
195 See Synopsis of Application of Written Description Guidelines, supra n.194 at 53, Example 14. 
196 Results of an unpublished study conducted by the author. 
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typically also the enablement requirement), and after some negotiation the examiner will 
allow a narrower claim amended to recite proteins sharing at least 90% identity to the 
recited sequence.  There is substantial examiner-to-examiner variation with respect to the 
stringency with which written description is applied to percent identity claims, with some 
examiners essentially refusing to allow percent identity claims no matter how narrow, 
others allowing extremely broad claims (e.g., 50% identity, or even less), and many 
allowing what they determine to be a reasonable scope of coverage, as illustrated by the 
example where a compromise was reached by the applicant amending the percent identity 
term to recite 90% instead of 70% identity.  In many cases, the examiner will allow 
broader scope of coverage (a lower percent identity term) in cases where the applicant 
discloses some relationship between the biomolecule’s structure and function.197 
Reflecting this disparate treatment, a survey of issued biomolecule patents will reveal a 
wide range of percent identity terms, varying from 99% to 50% or lower.198 
In contrast, the BPAI has been very consistent when it comes to LWD rejections 
of percent identity claims - my research identified six decisions wherein the board 
reversed an examiner’s LWD rejection of a percent identity claim, and not a single 
instance where such a rejection was affirmed. 
The earliest percent identity LWD decision that I identified is Ex parte Sun.199 
The rejected claim recited an “isolated Wee1 nucleic acid comprising . . . a Wee1 
polynucleotide  having at least 80% identity to the entire coding region of SEQ ID NO: 
1.”  The examiner pointed out that the patent specification failed to disclose a single 
 
197 See, e.g, Ex parte Smith, infra at note 207. 
198 Supra note 196. 
199 Appeal No. 2003-1993, Application No.09/470,526, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd031993.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).   
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example of a Wee1 variant retaining the activity of Wee1 and sharing only 80% identity 
with the reference sequence, and argued that the “specification does not set forth what 
specific structural or physical features define the claimed isolated nucleic acids,” and that 
one skilled in the art “could not predict the structure and function of isolated nucleic 
acids comprising a Wee1 polynucleotide having at least 80% identity to the entire coding 
region of SEQ ID NO:1.”   This would seem to be a valid application of LWD as a super-
enablement requirement, focusing on claim breadth, lack of structural definition and lack 
of representative examples.  Nevertheless, the board reversed the LWD rejection, citing 
Enzo II and holding that the disclosure of the single reference sequence and methodology 
for screening for variants having Wee1 activity was sufficient to satisfy the LWD 
requirement. 
Then, in Ex parte Bandman et al. (Bandman I) 200 and Ex Parte Au-Young et 
al.,201 the board reversed LWD rejections of claims encompassing any “naturally-
occurring” polynucleotide encoding an amino acid sequence sharing 90% identity to a 
disclosed reference sequence.202 In both cases, the examiners’ rejections were based on a 
determination that the disclosure provided no guidance as to how the sequences of 
naturally-occurring alleles could be distinguished from non-naturally occurring 
sequences, and no way to predict they would all have function.  The Board disagreed, 
finding that 90% identity and naturally occurring were enough to adequately describe the 
genus, even without a functional limitation.  Note that the examiners rejection was based 
 
200 Appeal No. 2003-1805, Application No. 09/079,892 at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd031805.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). 
201 Appeal No. 2003-1817, Application No. 09/501,714 at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd031817.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). 
202 In Bandman I, the examiner had allowed a claim to the genus of polynucleotides having at least 90% 
identity to a reference sequence and retaining the functional activity of the reference sequence. 
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on the same rationale used by the Federal Circuit in Amgen v. Chugai when it found a 
biomolecule claim invalid for lack of enablement.203 
In Ex parte Meyers,204 the board reversed the LWD rejection of a claim 
encompassing all nucleotide sequences having at least 70% identity with the reference 
sequence and encoding a polypeptide having dehydrogenase activity.  Not only is the 
70% identity term broad in a structural sense, the functional limitation itself is very 
broad.  The term “dehydrogenase activity” does not refer to single, specific function, but 
rather is a generic term referring to the chemical reactions catalyzed by a large family of 
diverse proteins involved in a variety of physiological pathways.205 
In Ex parte Bandman et al. (Bandman II),206 the board reversed the LWD 
rejection of a claim encompassing any “isolated polynucleotide encoding a polypeptide . . 
. comprising a naturally-occurring amino acid sequence at least 95% identical to the 
amino acid sequence of SEQ ID NO:1.”  The Examiner supported the rejection by 
pointing out that the specification provided only a single representative sequence and “no 
disclosure of any particular structure to function/activity relationship in the single 
disclosed species.”  The Board was not convinced, faulting the examiner for failing to 
provide adequate explanation or evidence to support the assertion that the specification 
failed to disclose any structure to function/activity relationship.  Upon review of the 
 
203 See supra Part II. 
204 Appeal No. 2003-1820, Application No. 09/464,039.  This decision was not available on either Westlaw 
or in the PTO database, but is publicly available in the file history, and a copy was kindly provided to me 
by an attorney who worked on the appeal. 
205 See, e.g., Enzyme Nomenclature: Recommendations of the Nomenclature Committee of the 
International Union of Biochemistry and Molecular Biology on the Nomenclature and Classification of 
Enzymes by the Reactions They Catalyse, at http://www.chem.qmul.ac.uk/iubmb/enzyme/  (last visited 
Sept. 3, 2006). 
206 Appeal No. 2004-2319, Application No. 09/915,694, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd042319.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).  
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specification, it appears that the examiner’s assertion was correct, in that there is no 
specific discussion of correlation between structure and function.   
Most recently, in Ex parte Smith207 the board reversed the LWD rejection of a 
claim reciting a method that included a step of “adding isolated viral reaper protein 
having at least 50% sequence similarity to SEQ ID NO:2 and capable of inducing caspase 
activation in a vertebrate cell.”208 Note that typically protein genuses are defined in terms 
of percent “identity;” not “similarity.”  Similarity encompasses not only identical 
residues, but also conservative amino acid substitutions, so the genus in this case is much 
broader than even 50% identity.  Nonetheless, even 50% identity would be quite broad, 
with 70% identity usually being considered a rough cut-off for detecting homology 
between proteins.  The board seemed to be impressed by the fact that in this case the 
specification described 15 variants of the reference viral reaper protein, sharing between 
62%-87% similarity to the reference sequence.  In the view of the board, this information 
amounted to a description of a relationship between structure and function, which under 
Enzo II can be used to satisfy the LWD requirement in the absence of a literal disclosure 
of structure. 
c. Hybridization Claims 
Another commonly used technique for achieving broad genus coverage of a 
polynucleotide is by means of a “hybridization claim,” i.e., a claim that encompasses any 
polynucleotide capable of hybridizing to a reference sequence, or the reference 
 
207 Appeal No. 2005-0147, Application No. 10/203,081, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd050147.pdf).   
208 The examiner had already allowed a dependent claim that recited variants sharing 75% similarity, so 
apparently for this examiner the issue was not the use of percent similarity, but the magnitude of the 
percent identity term.   
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sequence’s complement.209 In as sense, hybridization is a proxy for percent identity, 
because there is a correlation between the degree of percent identity between two 
polynucleotide sequences and their ability to hybridize to one another.210 
As is the case with percent identity claims, the Written Description Guidelines 
specifically sanction the use of percent identity claims, at least where the claim recites 
relatively high stringency hybridization conditions.211 However, an examiner will often 
invoke the LWD requirement to reject a hybridization claim which she feels is overly 
broad, such as in cases where the claim recites relatively low or moderate stringency 
hybridization conditions. 
In my review of BPAI decisions, I found two cases where the board reversed 
rejections of hybridization claims, and no instance where such a rejection was affirmed.  
In Ex parte Herrmann et al.,212 the board reversed a LWD rejection of a claim that 
encompassed any polynucleotide capable of hybridizing to any of a large number of 
reference polynucleotide sequences under defined hybridization conditions.213 
209 See Synopsis of Application of Written Description Guidelines, supra n.194 at 38, Example 10.  
210 However, the ability of two polynucleotides to hybridize to one another is dictated not only by the 
degree of percent identity, but also by the chemical nature of the sequences (GC-rich sequences tend to 
hybridize more readily than AT-rich sequences sharing the same percent identity) and the specific 
hybridization conditions (temperature and chemical environment).  Hence, the correlation between percent 
identity and the ability to hybridize is real, but not directly proportional.   
211 See supra note 209.  With hybridization claims, the scope of coverage depends upon the “stringency” of 
the experimental conditions used to determine whether two sequences hybridize.  Under high stringency 
conditions, only polynucleotides sharing a relatively high degree of percent identity will hybridize, while 
under less stringent conditions less similar polynucleotides will be able to hybridize.  In other words, the 
lower the stringency of hybridization conditions applicable to a hybridization claim, the broader the claim. 
212 Appeal No. 2002-1630, Application No. 09/175,713, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd021630.pdf  (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). 
213 The claim specifically recited hybridization claims or either (i) 4xSSC at 65°C or (ii) 50% formamide 
and 4xSSC at 42°C. 
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In the other hybridization decision, Ex parte Chung et al.,214 the board reversed a 
LWD rejection of a claim reciting a genus of isolated nucleic acids defined essentially in 
terms of three criteria: (1) percent identity to a disclosed reference sequence, (2) the 
ability to hybridize to the reference sequence, and (3) the correspondence of the nucleic 
acid to an mRNA differentially expressed in certain types of cancerous tissues.  The 
claim is analogous to Example 9 in the Written Description Guidelines, the main 
difference being that in Example 9 the functional limitation relates to the function of a 
protein encoded by the nucleic acid, while in this case the functional limitation relates to 
differential mRNA expression in carcinoma tissue.215 The Examiner felt that this 
difference brought the claim out of compliance with LWD, but the Board disagreed, 
noting that in both cases the “functional” limitation could be determined by testing. 
In support of the LWD rejection, the examiner argued that the functional 
characteristic of the genus (differential expression, which is not really a function) was 
“uncoupled with the structure of the claimed genus.”  However, the Board found that 
examiner had not explained why that matters; i.e., the board fails to even acknowledge 
the role of chemical structure in compliance with LWD. 
d. Fragment Claims 
Another claiming technique for obtaining broad genus coverage around a 
disclosed biomolecule is to claim any biomolecule comprising some relatively short 
fragment (i.e., segment) of the disclosed protein or nucleic acid sequence.  Because of the 
power of “comprising” language in patent claims, discussed above, these fragment claims 
 
214 Appeal No. 2004-2201, Application No. 09/788,476, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd042201.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). 
215 See Synopsis of Application of Written Description Guidelines, supra n.194 at 35, Example 9. 
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can result in extremely broad genus coverage surrounding the disclosed biomolecule.  For 
example, a typical disclosed protein might be made up of 300 amino acids.  A claim to 
any protein comprising any 10 contiguous amino acid sequence of the molecule would be 
infringed by any protein sharing at least one stretch of 10 contiguous amino acids; any 
and all of the remaining 290 amino acids could be altered, and amino acids could be 
added or deleted.  The claim could cover proteins that are almost totally unrelated (other 
than the short 10 amino acid fragment), including as of yet undiscovered proteins never 
contemplated by the inventor and having vastly different functional properties than the 
disclosed biomolecule. 
In three of the BPAI decisions that I found in my search the board considered 
LWD rejections of fragment claims, and in all three cases the board reversed these 
rejections.  For example, in Ex parte McElroy et al.,216 the board reversed a LWD 
rejection of a polynucleotide fragment claim, specifically, a claim directed to fragments 
of a promoter sequence.   The inventors had discovered a 3536 base long stretch of 
genetic sequence containing somewhere within its length a promoter sequence. 
Recognizing that not all of the 3536 bases were required for promoter activity, they 
claimed any polynucleotide comprising at least 95 contiguous bases of the disclosed 
promoter sequence and retaining the promoter activity.  The examiner’s LWD rejection 
was based on the lack of disclosure of any structure-function correlation that would allow 
one to predict which 95 contiguous base fragments would retain promoter function and 
which would not.  However, the Board held that no disclosure of structure-function 
correlation was required to satisfy the LWD requirement.  The disclosure of the 3536 
 
216 Appeal No. 2003-0936 , Application No. 09/352,806, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd030936.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). 
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base reference sequence inherently included the disclosure of each 95 base fragment, and 
according to the board this was all that was required to satisfy the LWD requirement. 
In Ex parte Hermann et al., a claim covering any “polynucleotide encoding a 
protein comprising an amino-terminal fragment of [a disclosed amino acid sequence]” 
was rejected for violation of the LWD requirement, and the board reversed.217 
More recently, in Ex parte Friedberg et al.,218 the board reversed a LWD rejection 
of claims to fragments of a protein.  The inventor had discovered a novel protein 
(hundreds of amino acids in length) and claimed any isolated polypeptide comprising at 
least 10 contiguous amino acids of the protein’s sequence.  The case tracks the facts of Ex 
parte McElroy; the examiner found the claim to violate LWD for failing to identify which 
of the 10 contiguous amino acid sequences were involved in the protein’s function, but 
the board rejected this argument, finding that since the full length protein sequence was 
disclosed, inherently all of the 10 amino acid segments are also described.  The board did 
not consider function at all in its LWD analysis. 
Note that in sanctioning this claiming strategy, the BPAI is opening up the door to 
very broad claims encompassing much larger molecules that are not described by the 
specification, have not been actually reduced to practice, and have not been made 
available by deposit.  The approach is clearly at odds with the policy concerns which 
gave raise to LWD.  In fact, if the patentee in Lilly itself had used this approach, and 
claimed any polynucleotide comprising some fragment of the disclosed rat insulin gene, 
 
217 See supra at note 212. 
218 Appeal No. 2004-2314, Application No. 09/971,101, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd042314.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). 
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the claim would have likely encompassed the human insulin gene, based on the high 
degree of homology between the two sequences.219 
e. Genetic Constructs and Protein Fusions 
One of the methodologies that define biotechnology is genetic engineering, which 
includes the splicing together of DNA sequences from divergent sources to form genetic 
constructs that do not otherwise exist in nature.  For example, genetic engineering can be 
used to link promoter and gene sequences that that are not naturally associated with one 
another, thereby placing gene expression under the control of a foreign promoter.   
Similar technology can be used to fuse together genetic sequences coding for elements of 
two or more distinct protein precursors.  The expression product of such a gene chimera 
is a protein fusion, a single protein formed from the covalent combination of elements 
derived from two or more distinct protein precursors.220 I identified several BPAI 
decisions wherein the board reversed LWD rejections of claims directed to chimeric 
genes and/or fusion proteins. 
In Ex parte Fischetti,221the board reversed the rejection of a claim directed to a 
fusion protein comprising a “carrier” protein linked to some segment of a known protein, 
i.e., the “conserved exposed region of the M protein of group A streptococci.” The 
“carrier” protein element of the fusion protein is defined solely in terms of function, 
while the protein segment element, it is defined as encompassing any segment of the 
protein ranging in length from 5 to 130 amino acids.  The examiner pointed out that the 
 
219 Cf. Michael D. Plimier, Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk & University of California v. Eli Lilly and Co., 
13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 149 (1998). 
220 See, e.g., Capon v. Eshhar, supra note 117. 
221 Appeal No. 2001-2524, Application No. 09/369,295, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd012524.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). 
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specification failed to provide any guidance as to how one might distinguish between 
functional and non-functional segments,222 but the board found that the disclosure of 
structure or structure-function relationship was in this case not required to satisfy LWD. 
In Ex parte Evans et al.,223 the board reversed a LWD rejection of a claim reciting 
cells containing exogenous DNA encoding “functional steroid receptor proteins” 
operably linked to a control sequence (i.e., a promoter).  Both elements of the chimera are 
defined very broadly and in terms of function, without any structural description.  In 
particular, the genus of “functional steroid receptor proteins” encompasses a large family 
of diverse proteins.  There are many different types of steroids, many proteins which bind 
them, and these proteins can respond in a variety of complex ways to the binding of a 
steroid.  Not only does the claim encompass a large number of proteins known at the time 
of the invention, but many that had yet to be discovered.  For example, there is no 
limitation with respect to the source of the protein; it could be derived from any 
organism, or could be a synthetic protein that does not even exist in nature.  The promoter 
element is even broader, defined as it is solely in functional terms. 
In Ex parte Griffiths et al.,224 a representative claim recites a method that 
comprises administering to a patient a bispecific (i.e., chimeric) antibody and an F-18 
labeled peptide.  The claim specifies that the antibody comprises an arm that is specific to 
a target tissue of the patient and another arm that is specific to the F-18-labeled peptide.  
The specification and claims impose no structural restrictions on the peptides, and the 
 
222 The fusion protein is intended to be used as an antigen, and so would lack function if it included a 
segment of the M protein that was not capable of eliciting a “protective immune response.” 
223 Appeal No. 2001-2584, Application No. 08/462,917, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd012584.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).   
224 Appeal No. 2004-1660, Application No. 10/071,247, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd041660.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). 
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chimeric antibody is defined solely in terms of function.  The specification does provide 
the structure of three exemplary peptides that work.  The examiner rejected the claim 
under LWD, arguing that the three peptide species were insufficient to adequately 
describe the entire genuses of peptides and bispecific antibodies falling within the scope 
of the claims, and for lack of enablement.  The Board reversed both rejections.   
And most recently, in Ex parte Peoples et al.,225 the board reversed a LWD 
rejection of a claim directed to any proteins fusion made by linking two or more proteins 
derived from any of the following families of proteins: -ketothiolases, acyl-CoA 
reductases, PHA synthases, PHB synthetases, phasins, enoyl-CoA hydratases and beta-
hydroxyacyl-ACP::coenzyme-A transferases.  These classifications are based solely on 
the physiological functions of the proteins falling within the family, and do not imply any 
structural limitation upon the claim.  The claim is also exceedingly broad; each of these 
families includes a large number of distinct proteins, including proteins of diverse 
function and as-of-yet undiscovered proteins. 
f. Functionally Claimed Proteins 
In Ex parte Tully et al.,226 the board reversed a LWD rejection of a claim to a 
method for assessing the effect of a drug on long term memory formation comprising a 
step of determining “functional levels” of certain “activator or repressor” proteins.  The 
proteins are defined broadly and in functional terms.  The examiner noted that the 
specification failed to provide structural guidance with respect to how one would 
distinguish between proteins falling within the claim versus those outside the claim.  As 
 
225 Appeal No. 2005-1383, Application No. 09/364,847, at 
http://des.uspto.gov/Foia/ReterivePdf?flNm=fd2005138301-31-2006.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).    
226 Appeal No. 2003-0835, Application No. 09/149,371, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd030835.pdf) (last visited Sept. 7, 2006) 
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pointed out by the examiner, known proteins falling within the scope of the claim shared 
little structural similarity (approximately 18% “homology”), and the claim would 
presumably encompass as yet undiscovered proteins. 
g. Functional Protein Variants 
In Invitrogen v. Clontech, the Federal Circuit held that the disclosure of a single 
genetically-engineered functional variant of a known protein was sufficient to provide 
adequate written description to support a claim encompassing essentially any engineered 
variant of the protein sharing the modified function.  My search identified two BPAI 
decisions that reach a similar conclusion.   
In Ex parte Bornscheuer et al.,227 the board reversed a LWD rejection of a claim 
directed to a method for altering the function of a protein by random mutation of the gene 
encoding the protein228 and selecting for a mutation that results in a desirable alteration in 
the protein’s function.  The claim is not limited to a particular protein, but encompasses 
any protein falling within the scope of “lipases, amidases, nitrilases, ether hydrolases, 
peroxidases, glycosidases and phytases.”  These are all functionally defined families of 
enzymes;229 not only is there no structural limitation, but the claim scope is expansive, 
since each family comprises a diverse collection of functionally distinct enzymes. In 
support of the rejection, the examiner specifically cited the huge scope of the claim (the 
use of “any enzyme and any substrate” to produce a new enzyme (emphasis in original)) 
 
227 Appeal No. 2005-1745, Application No. 09/161,680, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd051745.pdf  (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). 
228 The claims specifies that the mutation occurs in a specified strain of bacteria that promotes mutations. 
229 The specification cites the use of IUB Enzyme Nomenclature,which defines these classes of enzymes 
solely in terms of function.  See Nomenclature Committee of the International Union of Biochemistry and 
Molecular Biology (NC-IUBMB), at http://www.chem.qmul.ac.uk/iubmb/enzyme/ (last visited Sept. 7, 
2006). 
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and the failure of the specification to describe a “correlation between the structures and 
functions of the reagents used in the methods.” 
In Ex parte Anderson et al.,230 the BPAI reversed a LWD rejection of a claim 
directed to any mutant of a specified cellulase protein having “endoglucanase activity.” 
Naturally occurring cellulases, including the specified cellulase, do not normally have 
endoglucanase activity, and the invention was the successful creation of a single cellulase 
mutant having the desired activity.  However, based on the limited disclosure of a single 
mutant the inventor claimed any mutant having this desired function, with the only 
structural limitation being that the mutant must have a histidine at a specified position in 
the amino acid sequence.231 In rejecting the claim, the examiner pointed out the extreme 
breadth of the claim in relation to the disclosure.  For example, the cellulase protein 
comprises 200 amino acids, and the claim only specifies the identity of one of these (the 
histidine).  The claim encompasses “variants mutated at any of said 200 amino acid 
residues,” and provides no guidance with respect to which of these variants would 
possess the desired function other than the disclosure of a single example.  The board 
explicitly interpreted the claim as encompassing any modifications of the cellulase, 
“wherein the modifications may be substitutions, insertions or deletions, with the proviso 
that the resulting cellulose [sic] have endoglucanase activity,” but nonetheless found the 
claim to comply with LWD. 
h. DNA Sequence Coding for a Structurally Undefined Protein  
 
230 Appeal No. 2005-0908, Application No. 09/261,329, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd050908.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). 
231 Histidine is one of the common amino acids encoded by the genetic code and found in nearly all 
proteins. 
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In Ex parte Knauf et al.,232 the board reversed a LWD rejection of a claim 
covering the genus of cDNA sequences encoding “the mature protein encoding portion” 
of a specifically recited protein.  The structure of the protein is not provided, but the 
claim does recite an approximate molecular weight of the “mature protein.”  The claim is 
intended to encompass structural variants of the protein, including the “Type I” and 
“Type II” forms.  The specification does appear to disclose the structure for at least one 
cDNA sequence falling within the scope of the claim, which would distinguish this case 
from the Federal Circuits decision in In re Wallach, discussed below.233 Still, as the 
doctrine is interpreted by the BPAI in this decision, LWD does not seem to impose any 
structural limitation on claim scope, so long as at least one structure falling within the 
scope of the claim is disclosed. 
i. Functionally-Defined Synthetic Biomolecules 
In Ex parte Usman et al.,234 the BPAI reversed a LWD rejection of a claim 
reciting a “pharmaceutical composition, comprising: at least one enzymatic nucleic acid 
molecule having a ribonucleotide at a catalytically critical site, at least one 
deoxyribonucleotide and at least one nucleic acid analog; and a pharmaceutically 
acceptable carrier.”235 
232 1999 WL 33501543 (B.P.A.I. 1999). 
233 In Wallach, the Federal Circuit found a similar claim invalid under LWD, but in that case the patent 
applicant had failed to disclose the structure for any DNA sequence falling within the scope of the claim.  
See infra note 258. 
234 Appeal No. 2002-1251, Application No. 08/459,340, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd021251.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006).  
235 Although purporting to be a written description rejection, the substance of the rejection was actually 
directed to the “how to use” branch of the enablement inquiry, i.e., it was based on the examiner’s 
skepticism as to whether the claimed enzymatic nucleic acids would actually perform as pharmaceuticals. 
The Board reversed, finding that description in words was sufficient to satisfy LWD. 
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The scope of this claim is particularly expansive, the range of potential enzymatic 
activities is virtually limitless, and the claim covers any nucleic acid molecule having any 
enzymatic function, so long as it contains at least one each of a ribonucleotide, a 
dexoyribonucleotide, and a nucleic acid analog.  The specification provides no guidance 
with respect to correlation between structure and enzymatic function. 
j. Hybrid and Recombinant Plants and Seeds 
In Ex parte Griffith,236 the BPAI reversed a LWD rejection of a claim directed to 
the genus of “any and all hybrid corn seeds, and the hybrid corn plants produced by 
growing said hybrid seeds, wherein the hybrid seeds are produced by crossing [a 
specifically disclosed, novel inbred corn line] with any second, distinct inbred corn 
plant.”  The examiner argued that since half of the genomes of the claimed hybrids are 
derived from a second, non-specified inbred corn plant, the specification failed to provide 
adequate description to support the claims. 
Likewise, the examiner rejected claims directed to variants of the disclosed inbred 
corn line that had been transformed to include a transgene in the plants genome, again for 
failing to describe the nature of the transgene.  This rejection was also reversed by the 
board. 
 B. Decisions Upholding Lilly Written Description Challenges to Claim Validity 
In the preceding section, the conventional view that LWD has dramatically 
restricted the ability of biotechnology inventors to claim their inventions is refuted by the 
large number of cases where the courts and BPAI have declined to apply LWD in such as 
 
236 Appeal No. 2004-1968, Application No. 10/000,311, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd041968.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). 
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restrictive manner.  In this section I will review all of the decisions I identified wherein 
the courts or BPAI have found claims to be invalid under LWD.  In view of the outcry 
over Lilly, it might come as a surprise to some that in the nine years since the decision 
there have been so few reported judicial decisions where claims have actually been 
invalidated under LWD.  In fact, there are only four Federal Circuit decisions,237 and a 
single district court decision (that was not subsequently the subject of a reported appellate 
decision). 
1. LWD in the Federal Circuit 
The first post-Lilly Federal Circuit decision wherein a patent claim failed to 
satisfy LWD was Noelle v. Lederman, an appeal of a BPAI decision in an interference 
contest.238 Noelle had successfully isolated a monoclonal antibody (mAb) capable of 
binding the mouse antigen CD40CR (i.e., a “mouse mAb”),239 and deposited the mAb 
with the ATCC, a publicly accessible depository for biological samples.  Based on this 
disclosure of the mouse mAb, Noelle attempted to obtain a claim encompassing any mAb 
capable of binding the human analog of the CD40CR antigen (the “human mAb”), and 
another claim directed generically to any mAb capable of binding CD40CR from any 
species possessing the antigen.  Noelle did not provide the structure for the deposited 
mAb, or any mAb falling within the scope of the claim, nor did he provide a structural 
description of the mouse CD40CR antigen, or CD40CR antigen from human or any other 
species. 
 
237 Excluding Enzo I, which was vacated.  Supra note 74. 
238 355 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  Technically, the claims were invalidated under 102(b), not LWD, but 
the 102(b) rejection was premised on the party’s inability to claim priority to an earlier filed patent 
application that did not satisfy LWD.  Nevertheless, even though the written description requirement was 
used to police priority rather than to invalidate an originally filed claim, the BPAI and court both clearly 
applied the LWD form of the requirement, so it is appropriate to consider the decision in this article. 
239 CD40CR is an antigen expressed on activated T cells, and is involved in the immune response. 
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The BPAI found that deposit of a single mouse mAb constituted sufficient 
disclosure to support a broad claim encompassing any mouse mAb .240 However, it held 
that the human and genus claims failed to satisfy LWD because the specification failed 
“to describe any structural features of the human or genus antibodies or antigens.241 
The Federal Circuit affirmed, citing the Written Description Guidelines Example 
16 (i.e., the antibody example) as “past precedent.”242 In Example 16, a hypothetical 
patent applicant reports generating a mAb and successfully purifying and determining the 
molecular weight for the corresponding antigen (a protein) – chemical structures are not 
determined for either the antigen or mAb.243 The Guidelines conclude, in effect, that a 
claim reciting a genus of functionally defined mAbs complies with LWD so long as the 
relevant antigen has been “characterized,” and this characterization need not include a 
determination of chemical structure.244 The mAb itself does not need to be characterized 
except by its ability to specifically bind the antigen, i.e., its function.  The court seemed 
to agree with the board’s determination that deposit of the mouse mAb provided 
sufficient characterization with respect to the mouse antigen to support the mouse mAb 
claim. Thus, in Noelle, the only Federal Circuit decision not authored by Judge Lourie 
that finds a biotechnology claim invalid under LWD, the panel apparently would have 
upheld the validity of a broad genus claim defined solely in terms of function, illustrating 
the general lack of support for LWD on the Federal Circuit. 
 
240 355 F.3d at 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004).   
241 Id. 
242 Id. at 1349.  This was probably an overstatement.  The court cited Enzo II for the creation of this 
“precedent,” butb recall that Enzo II dealt with DNA probes, not antibodies, and while the court in Enzo II 
did refer to the Guideline’s antibody example with apparent approval it was not a basis for its decision. 
243 See Synopsis of Application of Written Description Guidelines, supra n.194 at 59, Example 16.  An 
antibody is characterized and defined by its ability to bind a specific molecule called an “antigen,” which is 
oftentimes a protein. 
244 Id. 
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Not only were the invalidated human and genus claims extremely broad, they 
could have been comfortably invalidated for lack of enablement.  Although the issue of 
enablement was never explicitly addressed, the Federal Circuit’s decision implicitly but 
persuasively supports a finding that the claims were not enabled.  In affirming the BPAI’s 
determination that there was no interference-in-fact between the parties, the court 
determined that one of skill in the art would have had no “reasonable expectation of 
success” were they to try to isolate the human mAb based on Noelle’s disclosure 
considering the state of the art at the time.245 Although the “reasonable expectation of 
success” standard is normally associated with the nonobviousness inquiry, it is reasonable 
to equate a lack of reasonable expectation of success with an undue amount of 
experimentation, which would support a conclusion that a claim encompassing human 
mAb was not enabled by Noelle’s disclosure.  Thus, in this case LWD was not 
functioning as a super-enablement requirement, but merely as an alternative basis for 
invalidating the claims. 
Shortly after Noelle was decided, the Federal Circuit again found claims invalid 
under LWD in Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle.246 The patent was based on an 
important scientific discovery that eventually led to the development of so-called “COX-
2 inhibitor” drugs.247 COX-1, an enzyme, is the target of many of the traditional non-
steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDS), such as aspirin, acetaminophen and 
ibuprofen.248 Scientists at the University of Rochester discovered a second COX enzyme, 
COX-2, and had the insight that if one could identify a non-steroidal compound that 
 
245 355 F.3d at 1347, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
246 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
247 The notorious family of anti-inflammatory drugs that includes Vioxx, Celebrex and Bextra.   
248 Prior to the discovery of COX-2, COX-1 was known simply as COX. 
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specifically targeted COX-2 without affecting COX-1, that compound might possess the 
anti-inflammatory properties of traditional NSAIDS while avoiding the undesirable 
gastrointestinal side effects associated with traditional COX-1 inhibitors.  In their patent 
application they disclosed this insight, along with an assay that would allow one to screen 
for molecules capable of specifically inhibiting the COX-2 enzyme without inhibiting 
COX-1. 249 However, they did not disclose a single example of a molecule that would 
specifically inhibit COX-2, nor did they provide any guidance as to what type of 
molecule might have that property.250 Nevertheless, they obtained a patent broadly 
claiming any method of treating a patient with a non-steroidal COX-2 inhibitor, and they 
asserted this patent against drug manufacturers, such as Pfizer, who eventually did 
succeed in identifying and ultimately marketing COX-2 inhibitors as drugs.  In 
Rochester, the Federal Circuit affirmed the invalidation of the claim on summary 
judgment, holding that the mere disclosure of an assay for identifying a COX-2 inhibitor 
was insufficient to satisfy LWD with respect to a claim generically covering the use of 
such an inhibitor as a therapeutic.251 
Rochester is notable in a number of regards.  For one, it is the only decision, in 
the courts or BPAI, to find a claim invalid for failure to comply with LWD with respect 
to a molecule other than a biomolecule, 252 refuting the idea that LWD is specific to 
genetic sequences, biomolecules, or biotechnology.  And until very recently, it was the 
 
249 358 F.3d 927 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
250 In essence, they had disclosed methodology that would permit one to determine whether or not a 
molecule was a COX-2 inhibitor, and a use for that inhibitor, but they did not disclose how to make a 
COX-2 inhibitor.   
251 358 F.3d 929 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
252 The claim purports to cover any non-steroidal molecule that can function as a COX-2-specific inhibitor, 
and all of the commercial and allegedly infringing COX-2 inhibitors are small molecules, not biomolecules. 
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only judicial decision to invalidate a process claim under LWD253 – other cases apply it 
to product claims, and in Rochester the patentee argued that the doctrine only applied to 
product claims. 
The court focused its LWD analysis upon the lack of structural description for any 
molecule that would function as a COX-2 inhibitor.  However, as was the case in Noelle,
a strong argument can be made that the claims were invalid for lack of enablement, and 
that LWD functioned merely as an alternative grounds for invalidating the claims, rather 
than as a super-enablement requirement.  Although the Federal Circuit chose not to 
decide the question of enablement in Rochester, 254 the district court had invalidated the 
claims for failure to comply with both the enablement requirement and LWD.255 Not 
only did the purported inventors fail to disclose a single compound falling within the 
scope of the claim, they themselves apparently never succeeded in identifying such a 
molecule (and hence never enabled one to actually practice the claimed invention).  
Rather, history shows that is was only after multiple pharmaceutical companies instituted 
programs to identify and develop COX-2 inhibitors that any mode of practicing the 
invention was enabled.256 Not only did the patent specification fail to enable a single 
mode of practicing the claimed invention, but the scope of the claim was expansive, 
purporting to cover the use of any molecule having the desired function, and should have 
 
253 The other case is Lizardtech, which involves computer technology.  See supra note 271. 
254 Review of the enablement decision was considered unnecessary in light of the claims being invalid 
under Lilly. 358 F.3d 930 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
255 Id. at 919. 
256 Based on the author’s personal knowledge obtained while working as part of a group at a major 
pharmaceutical company attempting to develop a COX-2 inhibitor in the early 1990s. 
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been invalidated for exceeding the “reasonable correlation” test for compliance with the 
enablement requirement.257 
In re Wallach,258 decided in 2004, is notable as the only post-Lilly judicial that to 
my mind actually applies LWD as a super-enablement requirement, invalidating a genetic 
sequence claim that very likely could have withstood an enablement challenge.  
Wallach’s patent specification describes the successful purification of a human protein 
identified as “TBP-II,” along with a description of about 5% of the proteins structure and 
some other physical characteristics of the protein, such as its size and physiological 
activity.259 Standard methodology was available at the time which would generally 
allow one to isolate a gene for a particular protein based on the information Wallach 
provided with respect to TBP-II.   Based on this disclosure, the PTO issued Wallach a 
patent claiming the TBP-II protein, but balked at allowing claims directed to any DNA 
molecule that would code for the protein, i.e., TBP-II genes, citing LWD and Wallach’s 
failure to provide a chemical structure for the full-length protein, or any full-length gene 
encoding the protein.  In effect, the PTO interpreted LWD as requiring a strict disclosure 
of structure for DNA sequences, but not for protein sequences. 
The Federal Circuit, in an opinion authored by Judge Lourie, affirmed the BPAI’s 
decision. The court noted that a disclosure of the complete structure for the TBP-II 
protein that would have been enough to satisfy LWD with respect to the TBP-II gene 
 
257 At the time the patent specification was filed it was recognized that COX-1 and COX-2 were 
structurally very similar proteins, and thus it would be difficult to identify a molecule that would be able to 
recognize the subtle differences between the two related proteins, and thus bind to COX-2 without also 
binding to COX-1. 
258 378 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
259 The specification defined the protein in terms of its N-terminal amino acid sequence (i.e, structure for 
about 5% of the full-length protein), it molecular weight, its physiological activity, and by the method used 
to purify the protein, but did not disclose the structure for the full-length protein.  Id. at 1331-32. 
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(based on the genetic code and the known relation between DNA and protein 
sequence).260 However, the specification disclosed the structure of only about 5% of the 
TBP-II protein, and hence only about 5% of the DNA sequence encoding it.  Wallach 
argued that “possession” is the ultimate test for compliance with LWD, and that the 
partial structural information provided for the protein, combined with known 
methodology for using such information to isolate the corresponding gene, would have 
been sufficient to put a PHOSITA in possession of the gene.  However, at least in this 
specific context, the court found that an enabling disclosure that would put a PHOSITA 
in constructive possession of the genetic sequence was not enough to satisfy LWD. 
Harking back to Lilly, the court interpreted LWD as strictly requiring a description of the 
gene’s structure, either explicitly or implicitly (by disclosure of the protein’s structure).261 
The court did not address the issue of enablement; however, a quite plausible 
argument could be made that the claim could withstand an enablement challenge.  The 
patent application claims priority to a 1989 filing date, long after Lilly’s 1977 filing date 
and at a time when it would have been fairly routine to clone a DNA sequence based on 
the protein information provided by Wallach.262 1989 is well after the filing dates of the 
patent applications at issue in In re Bell and In re Deuel, and those decisions reflect the 
PTO’s determination that at that time the state of the art would have allowed one in 
possession of a protein to apply standard technologies to isolate the corresponding gene 
without undue experimentation.263 In any event, the court’s decision in Wallach is 
clearly focused on a lack of structural description, not the amount of experimentation that 
 
260 Id. at 1333-34. 
261 Id. at 1334-35. 
262 See, e.g., JOSEPH SAMBROOK ET AL., MOLECULAR CLONING : A LABORATORY MANUAL (2nd ed. 1989). 
263 In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781, 783 (Fed.Cir.1993) (citing a 1983 patent for the general methodology); In re 
Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1556 (1995) (citing a 1982 publication for the general methodology). 
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would be required to isolate the gene, or constructive possession of the gene, and in this 
sense LWD is being applied as a super-enablement requirement. 
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Wallach argued that it was irrational and 
inconsistent for the PTO to require a complete structural disclosure for the TBP-II gene 
but not for the corresponding protein, correctly pointing out that anyone having 
possession of a protein would by definition be in possession of the gene encoding it, since 
the protein itself implicitly defines all of the genetic sequences that would encode it.  The 
court, however, rejected this argument, holding that regardless of whether or not structure 
was required to satisfy LWD with respect to a protein, structure was clearly required to 
satisfy LWD with respect to a genetic DNA sequence.264 
One might conjecture that Judge Lourie’s acquiescence to the PTO’s 
determination that the protein claims satisfed LWD might merely reflect judicial restraint, 
and a reluctance on his part to venture an opinion on a matter not explicitly before the 
court.  However, both the PTO and applicant had briefed this issue, and in other instances 
he has shown no hesitancy to express his opinion with regard to issues that have not even 
been addressed by the parties.265 
How can one reconcile Wallach’s apparent strict requirement of structural 
disclosure with other Federal Circuit decisions, such as Amgen v. HMR, Noelle, Capon,
and Falkner, which clearly downplay the relevance of structure?  Note that the claims at 
issue in Wallach are much more closely analogous to the claims at issue in Lilly; in both 
 
264 378 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
265 For example, in Wallach he pronounced that the state of technology had advanced to the point where a 
protein of known amino acid sequence could put on in possession of the genus of DNA encoding it, even 
though that question was not before the court.  In In re Deuel, he raised potential enablement issues with 
regard to certain claims, even though issues of enablement had not been addressed by the parties.  
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cases, the applicant attempts to claim a naturally-occurring genetic sequence per se.
Thus, the claims assert a right to exclude any use of an isolated form of a naturally-
occurring biomolecule.  In other cases where the court upholds claim validity in the face 
of an LWD challenge, the biomolecule at issue is not naturally-occurring, but rather a 
synthetic product of biotechnological engineering.266 
One way of rationalizing Wallach, Lilly, and generally a LWD that requires a 
structural description to support claims to naturally-occurring gene sequences, is that it 
provides a useful symmetry with earlier Federal Circuit decisions applying the 
nonobviousness requirement to newly isolated genetic sequences.  In In re Bell and In re 
Deuel, the Federal Circuit reversed BPAI decisions that had found claims to naturally-
occurring gene sequences obvious in view of prior art that would have rendered the 
methodology for isolating and sequencing the genes obvious.267 Bell and Deuel have 
been widely interpreted as establishing a special, strict nonobviousness standard for 
genetic sequences (or biotechnology inventions), whereby a gene sequence can 
essentially only be rendered obvious by a disclosure of the genes chemical structure.268 
Note that under this standard, prior art that would “enable” a PHOSITA to isolate the 
gene sequences “without undue experimentation” (using the terms “enable” and “without 
undue experimentation” in their conventional, not legal sense) would not be enough to 
render the gene sequence obvious. 
 
266 Examples discussed herein include genetically modified cells and proteins (Amgen v. HMR), 
monoclonal antibodies (Noelle), genetically modified viruses (Falkner), functionally-modified protein 
variants (Invitrogen), and chimeric genes (Capon).  See supra Part IV[A]. 
267 In re Bell, 991 F.2d 781 (Fed.Cir.1993); In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (1995). 
268 Lemley & Burk, supra note 70, at 1596-95. 
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A jurisprudence under which prior art that enables an invention and provides a 
clear motivation to make the invention, yet does not render the invention obvious, results 
in a troubling asymmetry between the patentability requirements of Section 103 
(nonboviousness) and Section 112, first paragraph (adequate disclosure).  LWD, by 
requiring a disclosure of chemical structure in the case of claims directed to gene 
sequences that have yet to be isolated or structurally defined, restores the symmetry 
between 103 and 112, and in that sense achieve a desirable policy effect.  Perhaps this 
explains the retention of a strict requirement of structural disclosure for this particular 
type of invention (as exemplified in Lilly and Wallach), while the courts have distanced 
themselves from any strict requirement of structure outside this specific context. 
This symmetry could have been achieved in other, perhaps preferable ways.  For 
example, the Federal Circuit could effectively overrule Bell and Deuel, clarify that there 
is no special obviousness standard for biotechnology inventions, and find that an explicit 
disclosure of structure is not necessary if a biotechnology invention is otherwise 
obvious.269 Alternatively, if Bell and Deuel are to be retained, the desirable symmetry 
might have been better achieved if the Federal Circuit had created a special enablement 
standard for inventions directed to naturally-occurring gene sequences in a manner that 
mirrors Bell and Deuel. After all, if the court can create special rules of obviousness for 
certain biotechnology inventions, why not corresponding special rules of enablement?  
One advantage of using enablement rather than written description to achieve this valid 
policy objective would have been an avoidance of the doctrinal confusion caused by the 
creation of LWD as a distinct disclosure requirement. 
 
269 However, there are valid policy justifications for the biotechnology-specific obviousness rules 
established by Bell and Deuel, though a full development of those justifications goes beyond the scope of 
this paper.   
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Finally, it should be noted that if LWD is really only functioning as a super-
enablement requirement in the limited context exemplified by Lilly and Wallach, i.e.,
attempts to claim gene sequences based solely on the disclosure of a protein and general 
methodology for isolating a gene based on knowledge of the protein encoded by the gene, 
then the actual impact of LWD will be of diminishing importance.  In the very early days 
of biotechnology, typically a protein was isolated and characterized, and then scientists 
used the protein as the basis for isolating the corresponding gene - this is the scenario at 
play in Amgen v. Chugai, Fiers v. Revel, Lilly, Wallach, Bell and Deuel. However, as 
biotechnology developed it became more and more typical that the genetic sequence is 
determined prior to identifying the protein. Indeed, since Lilly was decided, Wallach has 
been the only judicial decision applying LWD to this type of invention, and there are no 
BPAI decisions (other than Wallach) applying LWD in this manner.270 Wallach’s 
priority date of 1989 was still relatively early in the development of biotechnology.  To 
the extent the application of LWD as a super-enablement requirement is limited to this 
specific category of invention, one should expect it to be of diminishing relevance. 
In Lizardtech v. Earth Resource Mapping, decided in late 2005, the Federal 
Circuit for the first time appeared to find a claim invalid under LWD that was not related 
to biotechnology or chemistry. 271 The specification disclosed a method for compressing 
a large digital image for storage in a computer memory, but broadly claimed any method 
of achieving that desired result.272 While the district court found the claim invalid under 
LWD, the claim could (and should) have been found invalid for lack of enablement, since 
it claimed in functional terms any method of achieving a desired result based on a limited 
 
270 See infra Section V. 
271 424 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir 2005). 
272 Id. at 1344. 
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disclosure of a single method of achieving that result.  The Federal Circuit affirmed, but 
the manner in which the district court’s decision is affirmed is quite unusual and fully 
supports my thesis that for most practical purposes the criteria for satisfying LWD and 
enablement are essentially co-extensive, so that LWD does not impose any meaningful 
limitations beyond those already imposed by enablement. 
Although the district court in Lizardtech invalidated the claim under LWD, the 
Federal Circuit did not actually affirm on the basis of LWD, but rather effectively skirts 
the issues by never using the term “written description requirement” in the decision. 
Without even acknowledging the long line of cases that have held that the enablement 
and written description requirements are two distinct requirements, the court merges the 
two doctrines into what it terms the “written description clause” of section 112.273 It then 
explains that the clause “has been construed to mandate that the specification satisfy two 
closely related requirements.”  First, it must describe the manner and process of making 
and using the invention so as to enable a person of skill in the art to make and use the full 
scope of the invention without undue experimentation, i.e, the traditional test for 
enablement.  Second, it must describe the invention sufficiently to convey to a PHOSITA 
that the patentee had possession of the claimed invention at the time of the application, 
i.e., the traditional written description test.274 Further, the court states that the two 
requirements usually “rise and fall together,”275 echoing back to as similar sentiment 
expressed in decisions like Clontech. Expanding upon this point, the court states that “a 
recitation of how to make and use the invention across the full breadth of the claim is 
 
273 Id. 
274 Id. at 1344-45. 
275 Id. at 1345. 
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ordinarily sufficient to demonstrate that the inventor possesses the full scope of the 
invention, and vice verse.  This case is no exception.”276 
After effectively merging the criteria for satisfying the enablement and LWD 
requirements, the court essentially applied  traditional enablement analysis as the basis 
for it’s affirmation of the lower court’s invalidation of the claim under LWD.277 
Lizardtech, far from supporting the notion of LWD as a distinct super-enablement 
requirement, clearly supports a conclusion that the two requirements are essentially 
redundant, justifying their merger into a unitary “written description clause.” 
2. LWD in the District Courts 
Turning now to reported federal district court decisions, it is perhaps telling that I 
was only able to identify one decision, not the subject of a subsequent reported appellate 
decision, wherein a LWD-based challenge to the validity of a patent claim succeeded.  In 
Carnegie Mellon University v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., a representative claim at issue 
purported to cover recombinant plasmids containing a DNA polymerase I gene, isolated 
from any bacterial source, under the control of a conditionally controllable foreign 
promoter. 278 The patent specification disclosed the structure for a single DNA 
polymerase I gene from a single species of bacteria, E. coli. On motion for summary 
judgment, the court held the claims to be invalid under LWD. 
The district court based its decision on a strict application of LWD, focusing on 
the lack of any structural description that would distinguish genetic constructs falling 
 
276 Id.
277 This obfuscation was later noted by Judge Rader. Lizardtech v. Earth Resource Mapping, 433 F.3d 
1373, 1380 (Rader, R., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (Fed. Cir 2006) (“ [T]wo clear 
statements of written description law … are relegated to bookends surrounding an enablement-based 
application of the new written description doctrine.”). 
278 148 F.Supp.2d 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
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within the scope of the claim from other genetic sequences.  However, it is important to 
keep Carnegie-Mellon in perspective.  Not only is this the only district court decision to 
apply LWD to invalidate a claim, the decision has effectively been overruled by a series 
of subsequent Federal Circuit decisions, particularly Enzo II, Capon, Invitrogen and 
Falkner.
Perhaps most on point is Capon. In that case, the claim at issue recited any DNA 
construct comprising two elements: (1) some portion of an antibody (not a specific 
antibody, but essentially any antibody); and (2) some portion of a protein defined solely 
by its function and its location of expression in the body (on the surface of cells in the 
immune system), and the court held that such a broad, functionally defined claim could 
satisfy LWD.  The two genetic elements are defined in much broader, generic terms than 
the DNA Pol I gene recited in the Carnegie-Mellon claim, and with much less structural 
constraint.279 If the standard for compliance with LWD adopted by the court in Capon 
were applied in Carnegie-Mellon, the validity of the claim under LWD would have 
almost certainly been upheld. 
It should be noted that some commentators have identified additional decision 
wherein biomolecule claims have been invalidated under the written description 
requirement and implied that the court’s decision was LWD-related.  However, to the 
best of my knowledge all of these decisions involved traditional written description, not 
LWD.  For example, a recently published comment seems to identify Abbot Laboratories 
v. Inverness Medical Technology280 as an example of LWD being applied to a 
 
279 At least implicitly, one can assume that bacterial DNA Pol I genes will share a significant degree of 
homology, and hence structural similarity. 
280 2002 WL 1906533 (D. Mass. 2002). 
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biotechnology patent. 281 However, the case actually involved traditional written 
description doctrine – in its decision, the court explicitly disclaims the applicability of 
LWD to the facts of the case, finding the doctrine applicable only to “biological 
materials.”282 
3. LWD in the BPAI 
I identified nine decisions where the BPAI found claims invalid for failure to 
comply with LWD.  This occurred either when the board affirmed an examiner’s LWD 
rejection, or sometimes when the board raised the objection sua sponte. Notably, all of 
the BPAI’s LWD decisions are in the area of biotechnology, illustrating the extent to 
which the PTO views LWD as a biotechnology-specific doctrine.283 
Of the nine BPAI decisions, six involved the appeal of an examiner’s decision to 
reject a claim or claims for failure to comply with both the enablement and LWD 
requirements, i.e, examiners tend to apply LWD in a manner that is redundant with 
enablement rather than as a super-enablement requirement. In three out of the six, the 
BPAI affirmed both the enablement and the written description rejections, and in the 
other three the BPAI affirmed the written description rejection and chose not to decide 
the enablement question as moot. 
In this section I succinctly summarize the nine decisions.  Note that the 
invalidated claims are all very broad, and as a consequence are either explicitly held 
 
281 Guang M. Whitley, A Patent Doctrine Without Bounds: The “Extended” Written Description 
Requirement 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 617 (2004). 
282 2002 WL 1906533 at *1 n.1. (“Eli Lilly is instructive for its general discussion of the description 
requirement, not for its application of the principle. That case involves the field of biological materials, 
which presents its own complications for the description requirement.”) 
283 As reflected in the Written Description Guidelines, wherein every LWD example relates to a 
biotechnology invention. 
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invalid for violation of the enablement requirement (by the BPAI and/or the patent 
examiner), or could have easily been found invalid under the enablement requirement if 
the BPAI had elected to take that approach. 
As discussed earlier, on a number of occasions the courts and BPAI have rejected 
LWD-based challenges to claims broadly encompassing functionally defined variants of a 
disclosed biomolecule.284 However, the BPAI has on two occasions found claims of this 
sort invalid under LWD.  In Ex parte Copeland,285 the earliest BPAI decision I found that 
decides an LWD issue, the patent applicant disclosed the amino acid sequence of a 
“human polymerase catalytic polypeptide,” and based on this disclosure attempted to 
claim any isolated DNA sequence “encoding a polypeptide having an amino acid 
sequence sufficiently duplicative of that of the human polymerase catalytic polypeptide” 
to retain human polymerase function.  The claim is very similar to the claim found 
invalid for lack of enablement in Amgen v.Chugai, even using the same “sufficiently 
duplicative” language.  The board reversed the examiner’s rejections of the claim based 
on anticipation and obviousness, but raised enablement and LWD rejections sua sponte,
an example where LWD and enablement were explicitly applied in a redundant fashion. 
Later, in Ex parte Grotendorst,286 the BPAI affirmed a LWD rejection of a similar 
claim.  The inventor had isolated a novel protein, and attempted to claim in broad terms 
any variant of the protein retaining the same “reactivity” (meaning function).  The 
examiner had also rejected the claim for lack of enablement, but the board declined to 
 
284 See supra Part IV[A]. 
285 1997 WL 1909887 (B.P.A.I. 1997).  The case was heard prior to Lilly (July 22, 1997), but the decision 
was apparently written after Lilly and the board raised the issue sua sponte.
286 Appeal No. 2002-0427, Application No. 08/179,656, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd020427.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). 
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address the issue of enablement as moot.  Nevertheless, the claim is clearly analogous to 
the claim at issue in Amgen v. Chugai and Copeland, and the board could have easily 
upheld the enablement rejection in this case as well. 
In Ex parte Reinherz et al.,287 the patent application claimed a genus of chimeric 
genes, as well as the fusion proteins encoded by the chimeras.  Although the examiner 
did not raise enablement or written description rejections, on appeal the BPAI raised the 
issues sua sponte and rejected the chimeric gene claims for failure to comply with LWD 
and the enablement requirement.  The application eventually did issue as a patent, with 
claims limited to specific, disclosed DNA sequences.288 
The outcome in Reinherz is hard to reconcile with subsequent decisions by the 
BPAI and Federal Circuit upholding the validity of chimeric gene claims.  Note in 
particular the close analogy to the facts in Capon, where the Federal Circuit reversed a 
BPAI decision that had found a claim to a broad genus of chimeric genes encoding fusion 
proteins invalid under LWD.289 The claims at issue in Reinherz and Capon are very 
similar in terms of breadth and supporting disclosure – both involve chimeric genes 
comprising elements encoding portions of immune system proteins, both encompass a 
huge genus of gene chimera variants, and both are supported by disclosure of one or a 
few species falling within the claim.  Probably the most reasonable explanation for the 
divergent outcomes is that the BPAI decided Reinherz prior to Enzo II, at a time when the 
BPAI likely felt compelled by the strong language in Lilly to apply a strict, structure-
focused interpretation of LWD.  If the BPAI were to decide the case today, subsequent to 
 
287 Appeal No. 94-1483, Application No. 07/695,141, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd941483.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). 
288 U.S. Patent No. 6,416,971. 
289 See Section III[A] supra.
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decisions like Enzo II and Capon, it would likely not find the claim to violate LWD.  In 
fact, several examples of the BPAI reversing LWD rejections of similar chimeric gene 
claims are described supra in Section IV[A][3][e].290 
In Ex parte Janjic,291 the BPAI entered a sua sponte LWD rejection to a claim 
directed to “a method for inhibiting angiogenesis comprising administering a 
pharmaceutically effective amount of a nucleic acid bFGF ligand,” i.e., a nucleic acid 
molecule capable of specifically binding the protein bFGF.292 The board pointed out that 
the specification provided examples of nucleic acid bFGF ligands falling into two distinct 
structural families, and noted that in all likelihood other, yet to be discovered, structural 
families existed sharing no structural similarity with either of the two disclosed families, 
while the claim encompasses all nucleic acids capable of binding to a specified ligand, 
including the yet-to-be discovered structural families.  The molecule is defined 
exclusively in terms of function, and the specification provides no disclosure of any 
correlation between structure and function.  The claim is also extremely broad, and could 
have easily been invalidated under a conventional enablement approach.293 
In Ex parte Weinberg,294 the inventors had identified a single base difference 
responsible for the conversion of a proto-oncogene (a ras oncogene) to the corresponding 
 
290 Ex parte Fischetti, Ex parte Evans et al., Ex parte Griffiths et al, and Ex parte Anderson et al. 
291 Appeal No. 2001-0545, Application No. 08/442,423, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd010545.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). 
292 A nucleic acid ligand is basically a nucleic acid (e.g., DNA) that folds to form a three-dimensional 
conformation that recognizes and binds specifically to another molecule, very much along the lines of an 
antibody.  Thus, the nucleic acid is functioning in a fundamentally different manner than most claimed 
nucleic acids, where the function is not based on its 3-dimensional folded conformation, but rather on the 
information contained in the sequence of the nucleotides. 
293 Interestingly, the case was remanded to the examiner, after which the claim ultimately issued in a patent.  
The only change to the claim was a superficial amendment that failed to address the clear issues of 
overbreadth and lack of structural limitation. U.S. Patent No. 6,759,392. 
294 Appeal No. 2003-0054, Application No. 08/308,193, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd030054.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). 
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oncogene.295 Based on this disclosure, they attempted to claim essentially any nucleic 
acid probe capable of detecting any single base difference responsible for the conversion 
of any proto-oncogene to the corresponding oncogene.296 The claim scope is extremely 
broad relative to the disclosure, purporting to cover any and all oncogenes, proto-
oncogenes and base differences, including the many that were not yet discovered at the 
time the patent application was filed.  Moreover, there is no structural limitation on the 
claimed probes.  The board raised a sua sponte LWD rejection to the claim.  Again, in 
view of the extreme breadth of the claims relative to the limited disclosure, this claim 
could have also been invalidated for under the enablement requirement. 
Interestingly, a dependent claim in Weinberg limited to human ras oncogenes was 
allowed by the BPAI and ultimately issued.   Subsequent research has shown that there 
are actually multiple ras proto-oncogenes, and numerous base differences resulting in 
their conversion to oncogenes.297 The claim has no explicit structural limitations, so 
these later discovered variants apparently all fall within the literal scope of the claim.  
Thus, we have yet another example where LWD has not restricted the ability of 
biotechnology inventors to obtain relatively expansive scope of protection based on a 
quite limited disclosure. 
 
295 A proto-oncogene is a gene that can be converted into an oncogene (a gene that codes for a protein 
which promotes the loss of cellular division control, and can lead to malignant growth, i.e., cancer). See 
DRLICA at 243.  The ras oncogenes was one of the first family of oncogenes to be discovered.  D.S. 
Goodsell, The Molecular Perspective: The ras Oncogene, THE ONCOLOGIST, 4: 263-264 (1999). 
296 A probe is a DNA or RNA molecule that finds complementary base locations by hybridizing to the 
complementary DNA or RNA. DRLICA at 314.   The probes covered by the claim would be useful for 
diagnosing a person’s likelihood of developing cancer. 
297 J.L. Bos, ras oncogenes in human cancer: a review, CANCER RES. 49:4682-89 (1989). 
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In Ex parte Granados,298 the BPAI upheld LWD and enablement rejections of a 
claim reciting a transformed plant comprising an expression vector, the expression vector 
comprising a gene encoding an “invertebrate intestinal mucin (IIM) protein” operably 
linked to an expression control sequence (i.e., a promoter).  The applicant had disclosed 
the structures for two IIM proteins derived from a single species of insect.  Note the 
extreme breadth of the claim, encompassing as it does all invertebrates, relative to a 
limited disclosure of two examples of the claimed protein family, both derived from the 
same insect.  Appropriately, the examiner and board explicitly found the overly broad 
claim invalid for lack of enablement, yet another example of the redundancy between 
LWD and enablement as applied by the PTO.299 
In Ex parte Drucker et al.,300 claims directed to mammalian homologs of a mouse 
promoter region were rejected under LWD, but not for lack of enablement.301 The 
rejections were essentiallly based on the fact that the claims defined the homologs 
primarily in functional terms without adequate disclosure of a relationship between 
structure and function.  The BPAI affirmed, noting, for example, that the specification 
described neither the structure of the claimed promoters, nor a functional assay to 
correlate structure to function.  An Amgen v. Chugai-type interpretation of the 
enablement requirement could have easily served as an alternative basis for invalidating 
the claims. 
 
298 Appeal No. 2002-2030, Application No. 09/294,663, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd022030.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). 
299 The board states that it was “well established” that a protein sequence does not provide adequate written 
description for a DNA encoding it, a proposition later clearly refuted in In re Wallach when the Federal 
Circuit held that a protein sequence does provide adequate written description for the DNA sequences 
encoding it.  378 F.3d att1333-35 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
300 Appeal No. 2004-2356, Application No. 09/833,740, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd042356.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). 
301 A homolog is a genetic sequence related to a second genetic sequence by descent from a common 
ancestral DNA sequence – typically homologs share some degree of structural similarity. 
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In Ex parte Polonsky et al.,302 a method of screening for a modulator of a “calpain 
10” (a class of proteins) was rejected for lack of enablement under LWD.  The BPAI 
interpreted the claim broadly as encompassing “any ‘calpain 10’ of any structure from 
any organism.”  The LWD rejection was affirmed because the board agreed with the 
examiner that the specification failed to disclose how one would even be able to 
distinguish between a calpain 10 and other proteins, particularly structurally similar 
proteins like calpain 5 and 6.  This would seem to pose a problem of definiteness; the 
examiner did make a definiteness rejection, but for some reason the board reversed that 
rejection while affirming a LWD rejection essentially premised on the “indefiniteness” of 
the claims.  The enablement rejection was considered moot, but again I would suggest 
that a claim encompassing  “any ‘calpain 10’ of any structure from any organism,” 
without providing sufficient guidance to even distinguish between a calpain 10 and other 
non-calpain-10 proteins, would clearly fail to satisfy the enablement requirement. 
Finally, Ex parte Rothschild303 involved a claim directed to a method of screening 
animals for litter size by looking for polymorphisms in a specified gene sequence.304 The 
claim was supported by the disclosure of three such polymorphisms, all in pig.  The 
examiner rejected the claim for inadequate enablement and LWD, noting that the claimed 
genus included “an enormous number” of polymorphisms, without providing any 
“structural limitations or limitations which provide guidance on the identification of 
sequences which meet these functional limitations of associating a polymorphism with 
litter size.”  The board affirmed the LWD rejection, noting that the three examples were 
 
302 Appeal No. 2005-0258, Application No. 09/768,877, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd050258.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). 
303 Appeal No. 2005-1169, Application No. 09/900,063, at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/decisions/fd051169.pdf (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). 
304 A polymorphism is often defined as a genetic variant that appears in at least 1% of a population. 
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insufficient to support the scope of the claim, but without providing any guidance as to 
how one would determine how many examples would be enough.  The board also found 
relevant the fact the disclosure identified no common structural elements (i.e, no
correlation between structure and function), and the fact that all the examples were from 
pig and the claim encompasses all animals.  The board did not address the enablement 
rejection, finding it moot in light of it’s determination based on LWD, but the enablement 
rejection clearly should have been upheld in view of the lack of “reasonable correlation” 
between the expansive claim scope and limited disclosure. 
Note that in these nine decisions, there is not a single example of the BPAI 
applying LWD in a manner that prevents an inventor of a biotechnology invention from 
patenting her invention for failure to provide chemical structure, a primary fear voiced by 
Lilly’s critics.  Instead, in every decision the issue is one of claim breadth, with the 
examiner and/or BPAI applying LWD as a tool for limiting claims to a reasonable scope 
of coverage, a result that could have been better achieved using enablement.305 
V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
It has been repeatedly asserted that LWD is a super-enablement requirement, i.e,
that the test for compliance with LWD is more stringent than for compliance with the 
enablement requirement.306 If this were in fact the case, one would expect to find judicial 
 
305 In every case, the patent applicant would be able to patent her invention in narrower terms, and in many 
of the cases the applicant did ultimately receive narrower patents claims.  These “narrower” claims are in 
many cases still quite broad, e.g., the claims that issued from Ex parte Janjic in U.S. Patent No. 6,759,392. 
306See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc. 314 F.3d at 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The 
enablement requirement is often more indulgent than the written description requirement.”; Sven J.R. 
Bostyn, Written Description after Enzo Biochem: Can the Real Requirement Step Forward Please?, 85 J. 
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 131, 149 (2003) (“The standard as developed in Eli Lilly and repeated now 
in Enzo Biochem requires a more detailed disclosure than is required under the enablement requirement. 
That implies that parties wishing to invoke this defense, will immediately go to the written description 
requirement, as this implies a more detailed description, thus making the enablement requirement a 
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decisions where a patent claim is found to be enabled but nevertheless invalid for failure 
to comply with LWD.307 In fact, I was unable to locate a single judicial decision 
explicitly finding a claim enabled but invalid under LWD.  There is only one BPAI 
decision explicitly treating LWD as a super-enablement requirement, finding a claim to 
be “concededly enabled” but to fail LWD, but that decision was emphatically reversed by 
the Federal Circuit in Capon.308 
Conversely, a number of BPAI decisions explicitly find a claim to satisfy LWD 
but nevertheless invalid for lack of enablement.  For example, in Ex parte Reinherz the 
board considered the validity of a set of claims directed to a genus of protein fusions, and 
another set of claims directed to the genes encoding the fusion proteins.  The board found 
the gene claims to be invalid under LWD and enablement.  However, the board did not 
raise a LWD rejection with respect to the corresponding protein claims, only rejecting the 
claims for lack of enablement, i.e., the board interpreted LWD as being less restrictive 
than enablement, the opposite of a super-enablement requirement.  Likewise, in Ex parte 
Herrmann some claims were found invalid for violating the enablement requirement but 
not for violation of LWD. 
 
redundant one.”).  Rai,, supra note 4 at 834-35 (“[T]he Lilly court used the written description requirement 
as a type of elevated enablement requirement."); Mueller, supra note 63 at 617("The Lilly decision 
establishes uniquely rigorous rules for the description of biotechnological subject matter that significantly 
contort written description doctrine away from its historic origins and policy grounding. The Lilly court 
elevates written description to an effective 'super enablement' standard.”) 
307 The relationship would be analogous to that between lack of novelty and obviousness.  Lack of novelty 
can be thought of as “super-obviousness;” generally it follows that if an invention lacks novelty it is 
implicitly obvious, while it quite common for a novel invention to nevertheless be obvious. 
308 In Ex Parte Janjic the BPAI reversed an examiner’s enablement rejection and raised a Lilly rejection 
sua sponte.  Supra note 291.  However, the enablement rejection was based on the examiner’s skepticism as 
to whether the invention would perform the asserted functional utility, i.e., the “how to use” prong of the 
enablement inquiry, not the “how to make” prong, which is the analog of LWD.  In any event, the claim at 
issue in Janjic is extremely broad, and the board could have easily rejected the claim for violation of the 
“how to make” prong of LWD.  Interestingly, despite the board’s sua sponte rejection these extremely 
broad claims did ultimately issue, for reasons that are not apparent on the record. 
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Most BPAI decisions involve appeals where the examiner has raised parallel 
LWD and enablement rejections, targeting the same alleged deficiencies of disclosure 
and applying functionally indistinguishable LWD and enablement tests.  In other words, 
it appears that patent examiners are not treating LWD and enablement as functionally 
distinct patentability requirements, but rather as interchangeable requirements to be 
applied in tandem to what are perceived to be overly broad biotechnology claims. 
There are a number of BPAI and court decisions where claims are invalidated 
solely for violation of LWD, usually because the enablement issue is found to be moot in 
light of the LWD determination.  Nevertheless, in the majority of these cases, the claims 
could have easily been invalidated for violation of the enablement requirement. - LWD is 
generally not limiting the patenting of biotechnology in a manner that could not readily 
be achieved via the enablement requirement. 
The one scenario where LWD appears to be functioning as a distinct “super-
enablement” requirement is with respect to what I will refer to as “prophetic cloning” 
inventions, i.e., attempts to patent specific, naturally-occurring genetic sequences prior to 
actually isolating the sequence or determining its structure, as in Lilly and Wallach. As 
discussed supra, there might very well be valid policy reasons for restricting the 
patenting of this sort of invention, e.g., to provide symmetry with the obviousness test 
applied to prophetic cloning inventions in Bell and Deuel. In view of the technological 
trend away from isolating and characterizing proteins prior to their corresponding genetic 
sequences, this limited imposition of a “super-enablement” requirement should have little 
impact on the patenting of biotechnology. 
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In light of LWD’s limited impact in the courts, perhaps it should come as little 
surprise that in the nine years that have elapsed since Lilly the courts have failed to 
articulate a test for compliance with LWD that bears any meaningful distinction from the 
criteria for establishing enablement.  For example, the requirements of structure and 
sufficient examples to support a genus apparently mandated by Lilly have been steadily 
eroded by a series of Federal Circuit decisions exemplified by Enzo II, Noelle, Invitrogen,
Capon, and Falkner. The Federal Circuit’s fundamental test for compliance with LWD, a 
demonstration of “possession” of the claimed invention, has been applied in a manner 
indistinguishable from the test for enablement.  For example, in Capon the courts cites 
enablement cases and applies enablement criteria in assessing claims for compliance with 
LWD, and held that the BPAI’s finding that the claims were invalid under LWD could 
not be “reconciled” with the board’s determination that the claims appeared to be 
enabled.309 In Rochester, the court stated that LWD “serves a teaching function ... in 
which the public is given meaningful disclosure in exchange for being excluded from 
practicing the invention for a limited period of time,” which sounds a lot like the policy 
behind the enablement requirement.310 And in Lizardtech, the court combined LWD and 
enablement into a unified “written description clause,” and effectively applied an 
enablement standard to assess a claim for LWD compliance.311 
In the years since Lilly, there has been some confusion as to whether LWD is a 
doctrine particularly directed towards biotechnology,312 or a general requirement of 
 
309 418 F.3d at 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
310 358 F.3d at 922 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
311 Supra note 271. 
312Enzo I. 285 F.3d at 1025 (CAFC 2002) (Dyk, T., dissenting) 
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patentability.  There are strong indications that the PTO treats LWD as biotechnology-
specific, as evidenced by the Guidelines, which provide only biotechnology examples in 
its treatment of LWD, and the fact that all of the BPAI decisions involve biotechnology-
related invention.  However, in Rochester the court applied LWD to invalidate claims 
that were not limited to biomolecules (the claims covered the use of small molecule 
COX-2 inhibitors), and in the decision Judge Lourie expressed his view that LWD is not 
technology-specific.  In the recent Lizardtech decision the Federal Circuit upheld a 
district court’s invalidation of a software claim under LWD, although the Federal Circuit 
never explicitly addressed LWD, instead folding LWD into a “written description clause” 
that also encompasses the enablement requirement. 
Another general observation is that many judicial and BPAI decisions express the 
opinion that LWD is only applicable in cases where the claimed invention is a naturally-
occurring biomolecule, and not to synthetic biomolecules and genetic constructs, such as 
the gene chimeras at issue in Capon, the synthetically-generated protein variants at issue 
in Invitrogen, and the genetically-modified viruses claimed in Falkner.
Finally, it appears that in the courts LWD is being driven almost entirely by 
Lilly’s author, Judge Lourie.  Of the four post-Lilly decisions finding claims invalid under 
LWD, two were authored by Judge Lourie (Rochester and Wallach), and Judge Lourie 
was on the panel in a third (Lizardtech).  Noelle was the only decision in which he did not 
participate, and in that case the claims could have easily been invalidated for lack of 
enablement.  Furthermore, the Noelle panel explicitly endorsed the PTO’s Written 
 
(“Eli Lilly imposes a “unique written description requirement in the field of biotechnology”); Dan L. Burk 
& Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific? 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002) (Finding a 
stringent application of LWD in biotechnology patents that does not appear in other disciplines). 
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Description Guidelines, which provide that broad, functionally defined antibody claims 
can comply with LWD without providing any structural description of the antibody or the 
antigen recognized by the antibody, a clear departure from the original spirit of Lilly.
Judge Lourie also authored Enzo I, a particularly strong interpretation of LWD that he 
later backed away from.  Aside from Enzo II, Judge Lourie has apparently never sat on a 
panel that rejected an LWD-based challenge to claim validity.313 
It would seem that the primary impact of LWD has been to inject substantial 
doctrinal confusion into the patent law.  The one scenario where LWD appears to be 
playing a substantive role, i.e., the policing of attempts to claim naturally-occurring 
genetic sequences prior to their isolation or structural characterization, could more 
appropriately be accomplished by a technology-specific application of the enablement 
requirement, analogous to the Federal Circuit’s technology-specific application of the 
obviousness requirement seen in Bell and Deuel. In the interest of fostering coherent 
rules of patentability, the court’s should explicitly acknowledge the functional 
redundancy of LWD and enablement and restore the historical distinction between the 
two doctrines, employing the written description requirement to police new matter and 
the enablement requirement to ensure that the scope of patents claims is commensurate 
with the scope of the applicant’s disclosure.
 
313 With the exception of an early decision where he rejected an LWD-based challenge to an antibody claim 
because the issue had not been properly addressed at the district court level.   Johns Hopkins University v. 
CellPro, Inc. 152 F.3d 1342, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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APPENDIX: SEARCH METHODOLOGY
The primary intent of this paper is to provide a comprehensive survey of all 
publicly available decisions of the Federal Courts and the PTO Board of Patent Appeal 
and Interferences (BPAI) pertaining to LWD.  In keeping with this objective, I pursued a 
search strategy designed to be as comprehensive as reasonably possible. 
To identify relevant decisions of the federal court and BPAI, I conducted a search 
of the Westlaw databases containing all federal court decisions and all BPAI decision.314 
These databases were searched for any decisions subsequent to 1996 (Lilly was decided 
in 1997) containing the term “written description” in the same paragraph as a reference to 
any of the Federal Circuit decisions applying LWD to invalidate a patent claim prior to 
2006, plus Enzo II.315 The same search was conducted in the corresponding Lexis 
databases.  I reviewed each decision to the extent necessary to make a conclusive 
determination as to whether the case actually was what I will refer to as a “LWD 
decision,” i.e., a case where analyzing a claim for compliance with LWD, as opposed to 
cases involving traditional written. 
To expand upon the Westlaw and Lexis searches, I also conducted a parallel 
search of the PTO’s on-line database of “BPAI Final Decisions.”316 This database 
contains final decisions of the BPAI, primarily appeal decisions, but also interference 
decisions.   I reviewed all of the BPAI decisions dated from Jan 1, 2000 to October 31, 
2005, that were posted as of February 1, 2006, and all decisions between November 1, 
 
314 The “All Federal Cases” and BPAI databases, searches last updated July 17, 2006. 
315 The actual search terms used were: da(aft 1996) & “written description” /p ((Lilly /5 California) (enzo /5 
gen-probe) (noelle /5 lederman) (Rochester /5 Searle) Wallach). 
316 BPAI Final Decisions was available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/bpai.htm when I 
began this study.  The page was subsequently removed and all content relocated to the USPTO e-FOIA 
page at http://des.uspto.gov/Foia/BPAIReadingRoom.jsp (last visited Sept. 7, 2006). 
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2005 and May 31, 2006 that were posted as of June 7, 2006.  I reviewed each decision to 
the extent necessary to determine whether it involved LWD. By using the PTO database 
of BPAI decisions, I was able to identify a number of LWD decisions that for some 
reason do not appear in either the Lexis or Westlaw database.  Thus, the results of the 
BPAI search are more comprehensive than could be accomplished with Lexis and 
Westlaw alone. 
The Jan 1, 2000 cut-off at is to some extent arbitrary, but I think justified by the 
diminishing returns I saw in the sampling of decision I did identify dated prior to 2000.  
These early decisions typically do not have well-developed LWD issues, because the 
examiner’s typically did not include LWD or Lilly in their appeal briefs.  Normally, in 
these decisions where the examiner did not have an opportunity to explicitly address 
LWD, the board simply pointed out the issue and directed the examiner to consider it 
upon remand.  There are a couple cases in this time period (found in the Westlaw/Lexis 
searches) where the board does apply LWD to reject claims sua sponte, and these 
decisions are included in my analysis. 
A few caveats should be noted with regard to BPAI decisions.  The PTO will 
presumably only post publicly available decisions, so generally only in cases where the 
file history is open to the public.  The PTO generally seems to only post decisions where 
the corresponding application has published or issued as a patent.  Other decisions, which 
are technically publicly available, might not appear in the database if the application at 
issue does not publish or issue.  For instance, one of the BPAI decisions I identified as an 
example of the BPAI reversing a Lilly rejection does not appear in the PTO database (nor 
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in the Westlaw and Lexis databases), but is publicly available because a continuation 
application has published claiming priority to the application subject to the appeal.317 
Because the database only contains publicly accessible decisions, there could be 
some bias towards cases where rejections are reversed, since these tend to result in the 
issuance of a patent.  One would assume that in some cases the affirmation of a rejection 
will result in the application becoming abandoned, and hence the decision never being 
made available to the public.  However, I don’t think this is a major issue.  In many cases, 
an affirmed rejection does not prevent a patent from issuing, because other claims in the 
application are allowed.  I observed many examples where a rejection has been affirmed 
and the application went on to issue as a patent.  Also, the more recent applications will 
in many cases publish regardless of whether any patent issues, which is an alternative 
mechanism for making the decision publicly available.  Finally, in a personal 
communication with a high ranking PTO official, I was informed that to the best of his 
knowledge most BPAI decisions are posted on the PTO database.318 
In short, no claim is made that the results of the searches are totally 
comprehensive, and relevant decisions may have been overlooked.  However, to the best 
of my knowledge it is far more comprehensive than any previously published review of 
LWD cases, and is sufficiently comprehensive to draw meaningful conclusions with 
respect to the impact of LWD doctrine in the courts and BPAI. 
 
317 This particular decision was made available to me by an attorney who had worked on the case.  The file 
history of a pending unpublished patent application is available to the public if a U.S. patent publication 
claims the benefit of the unpublished patent application.  37 C.F.R. § 1.14(a)(1)(v) (2006). 
318 Personal communication. 
